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IF CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE, WHY CAN’T
THEY PLAY TAG?
Cody J. Jacobs*

ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior
Court—despite producing a splintered vote with no opinion
garnering a majority of the Court—made one thing clear: an
individual defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction simply
by being served with process while he or she happens to be in a
forum regardless of whether the defendant has any contacts with
that forum. This method of acquiring personal jurisdiction is
called transient, or “tag,” jurisdiction. Tag jurisdiction is older
than minimum contacts jurisdiction, and once was the primary
method for determining whether an out of state defendant could be
haled into a court. While Burnham held that tag jurisdiction
remained constitutionally valid, the court split on the justification
for allowing this form of jurisdiction, with four Justices approving
the practice under an originalist methodology, and four others
approving it based on contemporary notions of fairness.
This Article argues that both the originalist and fairnessbased tests proposed in Burnham support allowing the assertion
of tag jurisdiction over corporations and other entities through instate service on their officers. This Article shows that at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, corporations were
often subject to personal jurisdiction based only on their officers’
physical presence in a forum when served with process. The
Article also demonstrates that the fairness considerations
discussed in Burnham apply with even more force to modern
corporations because of their greater ability to take advantage of
the protections and services offered by states outside of their own.
Finally, the Article examines how the application of tag
jurisdiction to corporate entities would be in accord with general
trends in constitutional law affording corporations rights
equivalent to those of natural persons.
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Christine Bartholomew for her extensive and helpful comments on this piece. I am also appreciative of
all the feedback I received when I presented drafts of this paper to the SUNY Buffalo Law School Junior
Faculty Forum and at the 2015 Scholarship and Teaching Development Workshop at Albany Law School.
The paper also benefited from the excellent research assistance of Brian Sarama. This Article is dedicated
to my daughter, Evann, who was born while it was being written. May you never accept that “life isn’t
fair.”

1

2

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46; No. 1

INTRODUCTION
A French citizen voluntarily travels to California to attend a conference.
While there, he is properly served with a lawsuit by a California corporation. Even
if he has no significant ties to California and the lawsuit is unrelated to any California
conduct, there is no question under Burnham v. Superior Court1 that this hapless
French citizen would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the California, simply by
virtue of setting foot in California long enough to be served with process.
Now imagine a different scenario. A French corporation’s vice president is
attending a conference in California on behalf of the corporation. While in California
the vice president is served with a lawsuit by an individual plaintiff. Like the scenario
above, the lawsuit is unrelated to any California conduct and the Corporation has no
significant ties to the forum. Unlike the unlucky French individual in the first
scenario, the French corporation is not so clearly subject to personal jurisdiction. In
fact, this second scenario describes the facts of Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, where
the Ninth Circuit held that a French corporation—which allegedly manufactured and
designed a defective plane that crashed, killing 68 people—could not be subject to
personal jurisdiction in California even though its vice president was served in
California.2
Why is it that a corporation is allowed to come and go from a state with
impunity but an individual risks being haled into court simply by stepping across the
state line? This Article argues that corporations3 should be subject to “tag”
jurisdiction by allowing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a corporation in
any forum where an officer is served while voluntarily present on the corporation’s
behalf.4 Applying tag jurisdiction to corporations is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning for applying it to individual persons. Tag jurisdiction also fits into
the theoretical framework in modern constitutional law of corporations as entities
with constitutional protections equal to natural persons.
This Article will trace the history of tag jurisdiction, culminating in the
Supreme Court’s split decision in Burnham endorsing that practice even in the age
of modern “minimum contacts” jurisdictional analysis. Burnham laid out two
competing due process justifications for the continuing vitality of tag jurisdiction.
1. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
2. 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. Although this Article mostly refers to corporations—which have been the subject of most
litigation about this issue—the logic that would lead to the application of tag jurisdiction to corporations
applies equally to other types of non-individual entities such as limited liability companies and
partnerships.
4. Commentators and courts have also often used the phrase “transient jurisdiction” to describe this
phenomenon. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 632–636, 638 (Brennan, J., concurring); Armand Paliotta,
Jurisdiction: Burnham v. Superior Court: Adding Confusion to Transient Jurisdiction, 44 OKLA. L. REV.
551 (1991); see also Joel H. Spitz, The “Transient Rule” of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned
Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 181 & n.3 (1989) (“The term ‘transient
jurisdiction’ refers to jurisdiction over persons temporarily present in the forum. See R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 410 (3d ed. 1986).”). Other commentators have used other
terminology. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and
the Abolition of the “Gotcha” Theory, 30 EMORY L. J. 729 (1981) (referring to transient jurisdiction as
the ‘Gotcha’ theory). This Article uses the phrases “tag jurisdiction” and “transient jurisdiction”
interchangeably.
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Those two justifications were based on the historical pedigree of tag jurisdiction and
its inherent fairness. This article argues that both of these justifications strongly
support the application of tag jurisdiction in the corporate context, because tag
jurisdiction was frequently applied to corporations at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification and because applying tag jurisdiction to corporations is at
least as inherently fair as applying it to natural persons.
The Article will also look at this issue through the lens of modern
constitutional corporate personhood. Corporations have been afforded constitutional
rights because they have been conceived of as the equivalent of natural people.
Accordingly, corporate constitutional rights claims are almost never analyzed any
differently than those of natural persons. This theoretical framework should entitle
corporations to rights equal to those of natural persons—no more, no less. Yet, courts
refusing to apply tag jurisdiction to corporations incongruously afford corporations
greater protection under the Due Process Clause than natural persons.
This Article begins in Part II with an overview of the history of tag
jurisdiction and the Court’s modern personal jurisdiction doctrine, and an
examination of the two principal opinions in Burnham. Part III will argue that the
justifications for tag jurisdiction offered in Burnham strongly support the application
of tag jurisdiction to corporations. Part IV will survey and critique the lower court
decisions addressing whether corporations are subject to tag jurisdiction after
Burnham. Part V will explain how applying tag jurisdiction to corporations is
consistent with the recent treatment of corporations as equivalent to natural persons
in other areas of constitutional law.
I. MODERN PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE: RUNNING AWAY
FROM TAG AND BACK AGAIN
A court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over a person, i.e. in personam
jurisdiction, was historically based on a simple idea: a court may exercises
jurisdiction over any person physically present in the forum.5 Over the last seventy
years — partly in response to technological and social changes that made it easier
for corporations to do business in multiple places at once —courts have adopted and
expanded alternative ways to assert jurisdiction over people and companies who are
not physically present in the forum when served with process, but nevertheless have
some level of minimum contacts with the jurisdiction that justify the assertion of the
court’s authority over that person or company. However, in Burnham, the Court

5. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610–11 (“Among the most firmly established principles of
personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents
who are physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State had the power to hale
before its courts any individual who could be found within its borders, and that once having acquired
jurisdiction over such a person by properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to
enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. See, e.g., Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63, 67 (Conn.
1793); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819). That view had antecedents in English common-law
practice, which sometimes allowed ‘transitory’ actions, arising out of events outside the country, to be
maintained against seemingly nonresident defendants who were present in England.”); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (noting the “well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction
of an independent State over persons and property . . . that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory”).
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made clear that this minimum contacts analysis was intended to supplement
traditional in personam jurisdiction based on physical presence, not to replace it
entirely.6
A.

Modern Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Away From Tag, Towards
Minimum Contacts

Prior to 1877, the question of personal jurisdiction was solely focused on
physical presence.7 Under this rule, courts could assert personal jurisdiction over any
person who consented to jurisdiction,8 voluntarily entered an appearance, had
property in the state, or was served while physically present in a state.9 A court was
able to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant who was served in a forum regardless
of whether the defendant’s presence in the forum was related to the litigation or
whether the duration of the defendant’s stay in the forum was lengthy or brief.10 The
only limitation was that courts would not assert jurisdiction over a defendant who
was served while physically present in a jurisdiction due to force, fraud, or in order
to be a party or witness in another judicial proceeding — in other words, the
defendant had to be voluntarily present in the forum in order for personal jurisdiction
to arise from service.11
In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court constitutionalized these traditional principles
of jurisdiction, holding that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant who was only served by means of publication was improper under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the defendant had not
consented to jurisdiction in the state, voluntarily appeared, or been served with
process in the state.12 Thus, this rather formalistic approach to jurisdiction became a
6. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619.
7. But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 25–32 (1990) (noting that “Supreme
Court intervention in state court assertions of personal jurisdiction did not, as one may sometimes gather,
begin with Pennoyer” and recounting several jurisdictional cases the Court decided in the context of the
interstate recognition of judgments).
8. Consent was—even in this period—often understood fairly broadly to encompass situations
where state laws implied the consent of defendants who choose to conduct business in a state or even
drive on a state’s roads. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine in a Twenty First Century World, FLA. L. REV. 387, 391 n.13 (2012) (listing methods that a
defendant could consent to jurisdiction during the nineteenth century, illustrating that—even in this
period—consent was often understood fairly broadly to encompass situations where state laws implied
the consent of defendants who chose to conduct business in a state); Borchers, supra note 7, at 29
(discussing a pre-Pennoyer example of the “fictionalized notion of ‘consent’” that “would come to be the
centerpiece of the [Supreme] Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence” several decades later.)
9. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 7, at 32.
10. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 612–13 (collecting cases).
11. See id. at 613.
12. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). See Borchers, supra note 7, at 38–43 (suggesting
that Pennoyer was a bit ambiguous and that Pennoyer could have been read narrowly—to only provide a
Fourteenth Amendment right to challenge a state court judgment collaterally to ensure that the state’s
jurisdictional rules were complied with, rather than to create any substantive limitations on the states’
ability to set their own jurisdictional rules); see also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 616–17 (“Pennoyer v. Neff,
while renowned for its statement of the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such an
exercise of jurisdiction, in fact set that forth only as dictum and decided the case . . . under ‘well-
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real limit on the authority of courts. However, in practice, this approach proved less
rigid then it initially appeared. In the years that followed Pennoyer, the Court
stretched the definition of “consent” to allow the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over defendants who were not actually served within a state’s borders by approving
statutory schemes that implied consent from certain activities such as doing business
within a state.13
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court decided to depart from
this fiction altogether in the landmark case of International Shoe v. Washington.14 In
that case, the Court held for the first time that the Due Process Clause requires “only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”15 The Court explicitly recharacterized its earlier opinions
expanding the scope of “consent” as instances where a defendant’s contacts with a
state were sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction.16 International Shoe’s
expansion of courts’ ability to assert jurisdiction over non-physically present
defendants was largely a response to the advances in communications and
transportation technologies that allowed people — and in particular companies — to
conduct business over state lines with relative ease.17
Over the years following International Shoe, the Court refined the
boundaries of this new method of acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-present
defendants. The Court eventually developed two different ways to assert jurisdiction
over such defendants: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.18 A court may
assert general jurisdiction only when the defendant has such “continuous and
systematic [contacts] as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”19

established principles of public law.’”). See Borchers, supra note 7, at 50–51 (noting that over the next
few decades, the ambiguity was resolved in favor of the broader reading of Pennoyer, firmly establishing
the Due Process Clause as a substantive limitation on states’ ability to exercise personal jurisdiction); see,
e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195–97 (1915).
13. See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617–18; see also supra note 8.
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. Id. at 316.
16. See id. at 318–19; Rhodes, supra note 8, at 398–99.
17. See, e.g., Warren B. Chik, U.S. Jurisdictional Rules of Adjudication over Business Conducted
Via the Internet—Guidelines and A Checklist for the E-Commerce Merchant, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 243, 250 n.28 (2002); Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 779–80,
782–83 (1995) (noting that with the refinement of the corporate form and easier methods of travel
“[c]orporations proved particularly troublesome” to courts in the post-Pennoyer, pre-International Shoe
era by making it difficult to secure jurisdiction over them in states where they may cause harm). But see
Logan Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological Jurisprudence
and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 62 (2001) (“[T]he decision [in
International Shoe] did not result simply from the expansion of interstate business or the inherent
weakness of the Pennoyer system. Instead, International Shoe was caused primarily by the emergence of
a new conception of the law and the role of the judge. It was only because judges saw the law through the
lenses of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism that judges believed International Shoe was
necessary to address interstate corporate activity.”).
18. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
19. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
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Once the existence of such contacts is established, a court may assert jurisdiction
over a defendant for any cause of action, even one not related to the defendant’s
contacts with that forum.20
Specific jurisdiction on the other hand, the far more litigated type of
jurisdiction,21 arises when the defendant’s contacts with the forum gave rise to the
cause of action.22 In assessing whether a court may exercise specific jurisdiction, a
court looks at whether the defendant “‘purposefully directed’ his activities at
residents of the forum” and whether the litigation “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to those
activities.”23 Even if such purposefully created contacts exist, and those contacts are
sufficiently connected to the cause of action, personal jurisdiction still may only be
asserted when it is consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”24 This analysis depends on “an evaluation of several factors,” including “the
burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, . . . the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining relief[,] the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”25
At first, the Supreme Court used these formulations to expand the scope of
state authority to subject non-resident corporations to personal jurisdiction.26
However, beginning in the late 1970s, the Court pared back the growth of minimum
contacts-based jurisdiction primarily by requiring a greater level of purposeful
availment on the part of defendants—especially corporate defendants—to subject
themselves to jurisdiction in a particular forum.27
B.

Burnham: Back To Tag Again, But Why?

Importantly, tag jurisdiction falls outside of the minimum contacts
framework of specific or general jurisdiction. Its exercise does not turn on whether
the defendant’s contacts with the state are systematic, related to the cause of action,
or whether those contacts are purposeful. Instead, it depends only upon whether the
defendant was served while voluntarily physically present in the jurisdiction. During
the entire period after International Shoe when the Court was developing the
minimum contacts doctrine, the Court was conspicuously silent on whether tag
jurisdiction remained valid.

20. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
21. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630 (1988).
22. See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
23. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citation omitted); accord Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case [to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction] that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”).
24. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(quotations omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316).
25. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
26. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 8, at 400–01 & n.73 (collecting cases).
27. See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of
Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 562 (2012) (“In the ten remaining personal jurisdiction cases of the
twentieth century—after Hanson and through 1990—the Court would reject jurisdiction in seven.”).
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In the absence of any indication to the contrary, courts continued to
recognize tag jurisdiction as a valid method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants even after International Shoe.28 These courts saw
International Shoe as a vehicle for expanding jurisdiction rather than contracting it,
and held that it only applied to situations involving substituted service where the
non-resident is not present in the forum.29 In perhaps the most vivid illustration of
the viability of this traditional form of jurisdiction in the modern world, a federal
district court in Arkansas upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant who was simply in a plane flying over Arkansas when he was served with
process.30
However, when the Court finally offered a clue of which direction it was
heading on the issue, it appeared to signal that tag jurisdiction was on its way out. In
Shaffer v. Heitner,31 a six Justice majority held that the physical presence of property
in a state was insufficient to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the absence of minimum purposeful contacts with the forum by
the defendant and a showing that asserting jurisdiction was consistent with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.32 Thus, even when the
defendant’s property is present in a state, “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.”33 The Court reached this conclusion after recognizing that the assertion of
jurisdiction over property — although it has a long historical pedigree — is really
just an assertion of jurisdiction over the property’s owner.34 The Court concluded
that this fiction “supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification”
and “[i]ts continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction
that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.”35
The Court’s virtually unanimous36 willingness to put an end to traditional
in-rem jurisdiction led many commentators to predict the demise of tag jurisdiction
28. See, e.g., Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976) (citations omitted) (“It
has long been black letter law that personal service within its geographical area establishes a court’s
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The cases relied upon by defendant discussing ‘fairness,’ etc.,
allegedly contra, are directed either to the fairness of the basis for substituted service when an individual
was not personally served or present within the area, or to the fairness of subjecting a foreign intangible
entity, such as a corporation, to the jurisdiction of the court. See, e. g., Hanson v. Denckla, . . . ;
International Shoe Co. v. Washington. . . . The concern, in other words, was with expanding jurisdiction
beyond traditional limits, not with contracting it.”); Nielsen v. Braland, 119 N.W.2d 737, 738 (1963)
(“This case involves service on an individual defendant within the State of Minnesota of a summons in a
transitory cause of action. The cases relied upon by defendant involve the amenability of a foreign
defendant to jurisdiction in personam by substituted service. . . . Where the defendant is present within
the state, except when exempt from service, and is personally served, the court acquires jurisdiction in
personam regardless of the fact that he is a nonresident.”).
29. See, e.g., Donald Manter, 543 F.2d at 420.
30. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 442–47 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
31. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
32. Id. at 212.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Six Members of the Court joined the majority opinion. Id. at 189. See also id. at 217–19 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (appearing to agree that the simple presence of property alone in a state was insufficient to
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as well.37 These scholars argued that Shaffer essentially severed the connection
between a state’s physical power over the property and people within its borders and
its ability to exercise jurisdiction.38 By replacing a traditional focus on physical
power with the modern International Shoe test in the context of dealings with
property, the Court appeared to be preparing to make a similar shift with respect to
people.39 Nevertheless, most lower courts continued to adhere to traditional tag
jurisdiction even after Shaffer.40 Thus, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to
resolve the divide between scholars and courts when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a case involving a New Jersey resident with no significant ties to
California who was served with a court summons and divorce petition during a brief
visit to California.41
Despite all the hype, the Justices agreed unanimously that tag jurisdiction
generally remained valid.42 However, they sharply disagreed on the rationale for that
holding, with no opinion managing to garner five votes. Justice Scalia, writing in
large part for four Justices,43 applied an originalist44 methodology. He began with a
discussion of the long historical pedigree of transient jurisdiction, tracing its lineage
back to English common law practice as early as the late seventeenth century.45
Justice Scalia noted that under this practice:

confer personal jurisdiction in the absence of some kind of procedure for notifying property owners that
such ownership subjected them to potential jurisdiction); id. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (agreeing with the Court that “the minimum-contacts analysis developed in
International Shoe” should govern the assertion of state-court jurisdiction even when property is owned
by the defendant in the forum state, but disagreeing with the Court’s application of the International Shoe
analysis to the facts of the case); id. at 216 (noting that then-Justice Rehnquist recused himself from the
case).
37. See, e.g., Daniel O. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of in
Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38, 66 (1979) (“But if due process means fairness based on the
existence of minimum contacts between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum, then it would appear
that in personam jurisdiction, grounded solely upon mere physical presence, is inconsistent with the
holding of Shaffer and should, therefore, be laid to rest.”); see also Douglas A. Mays, Note, Burnham v.
Superior Court: The Supreme Court Agrees on Transient Jurisdiction in Practice, but Not in Theory, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1271 n.5, 1283 n.104 (1991) (collecting sources); Earl M. Maltz, Sovereign Authority,
Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine of Transient Jurisdiction, 66 WASH.
U.L.Q. 671, 674 n.13 (1988) (collecting sources).
38. See, e.g., Bernstine, supra note 37, at 52–53, 61–62.
39. See, e.g., id. at 61–62.
40. See Paul C. Wilson, A Pedigree for Due Process? Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 56
MO. L. REV. 353, 366 (1991); B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097,
1117 n.78 (1990).
41. See Wilson, supra note 40, at 366 (noting the “nearly unanimous voice [of] scholars [who] had
counseled an end to” tag jurisdiction before Burnham was decided and the “equally unanimous voice [of]
state and lower federal courts” in upholding the doctrine).
42. See Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality); id. at 628–29
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 607 (noting that Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined in its entirety by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, and joined in large part by Justice White).
44. See Liang Kan, Comment, A Theory of Justice Souter, 45 EMORY L.J. 1373, 1379–80 (1996)
(describing Justice Scalia’s opinion as purporting to be based on the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
45. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610–11.
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[E]ach State had the power to hale before its courts any individual
who could be found within its borders, and that once having
acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly serving him
with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter judgment
against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.46
It was against this backdrop that Justice Scalia analyzed and rejected the
petitioner’s arguments for departing from this tradition. First, Justice Scalia
characterized International Shoe as merely holding that “the defendant’s litigationrelated ‘minimum contacts’ may take the place of physical presence as the basis for
jurisdiction[.]”47 The minimum contacts test “was developed by analogy to ‘physical
presence,’ and it would be perverse to say it could now be turned against that
touchstone of jurisdiction.”48
Next, in a portion of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that Shaffer required the
abandonment of tag jurisdiction.49 Justice Scalia argued that “Shaffer, like
International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent defendant, and it stands for
nothing more than the proposition that when the ‘minimum contact’ that is a
substitute for physical presence consists of property ownership it must, like other
minimum contacts, be related to the litigation.”50 Justice Scalia dismissed Shaffer’s
seemingly clear statement that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny”51 as simply a statement that
quasi in rem jurisdiction . . . and in personam jurisdiction, are
really one and the same and must be treated alike—leading to the
conclusion that quasi in rem jurisdiction, i.e., that form of in
personam jurisdiction based upon a ‘property ownership’ contact
and by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state service,
must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International
Shoe.52
Thus, “[t]he logic of Shaffer’s holding—which places all suits against absent
nonresidents on the same constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate
Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact—does not compel the

46. Id. See id. at 611 (admitting that recent scholarship had called into question how firmly rooted
that English tradition actually was). But see id. (noting that whether that perception of history was accurate
or not, it was the perception that was “shared by American courts at the crucial time for present purposes:
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”).
47. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 619.
49. See id. at 619–20 (characterizing this point as petitioner’s “strongest argument,” perhaps
suggesting Justice Scalia’s underlying disagreement with Shaffer). See also Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621–
22, 621 n.4 (admitting that “[i]t is fair to say, however, that while our holding today does not contradict
Shaffer, our basic approach to the due process question is different” and asserting that Shaffer “may have
involved a unique state procedure” for acquiring in rem jurisdiction).
50. Id. at 620.
51. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
52. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620–21.
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conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically to absent
ones.”53
The core of the disagreement among the Members of the Court in Burnham
was whether tradition alone could justify the continuation of tag jurisdiction. Justice
Brennan’s opinion for four justices,54 while agreeing with Justice Scalia that “the
Due Process Clause . . . generally permits a state court to exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant if he is served with process while voluntarily present in the
forum[,]”sharply disagreed with the idea that tradition should be “the only factor” in
determining whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements.55
Instead, Justice Brennan proposed an “independent inquiry into the . . . fairness of
the” rule being evaluated.56
Justice Brennan argued that the originalist approach suggested in Justice
Scalia’s opinion was inconsistent with the Court’s decisions in Shaffer and
International Shoe, with the former casting off a traditionally valid form of
jurisdiction and the latter allowing an expansion of jurisdiction not supported by
tradition.57 Instead, Justice Brennan proposed that tradition should be just one factor
in a larger fairness inquiry.58
Applying that fairness analysis to tag jurisdiction, Justice Brennan first
noted that, because tag jurisdiction was a longstanding tradition59 in the United
States, defendants were on notice that they may be subject to jurisdiction in a forum
by physically entering it.60 Justice Brennan further noted that a person avails himself
of significant benefits of a forum simply by choosing to enter it, including gaining
access to the state’s emergency services, roads, and “the fruits of the State’s
economy[.]”61 The opinion also argued that “[w]ithout transient jurisdiction, an
asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the full benefit of the power of the
forum State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from their authority as a
defendant.”62 Finally, the opinion found the exercise of jurisdiction over transient
defendants fair because of advances in transportation and communications
technology that make it easier for a non-resident to defend themselves in a foreign
forum, particularly one that non-resident already visited at least once when he or she
was served with process.63

53. Id. at 621.
54. Id. at 628 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Brennan’s opinion was joined by Justice
Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice O’Connor).
55. Id. at 628–29 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 629.
57. See id. at 629–33.
58. See id. at 633.
59. See id. at 634–35 & nn.9–10 (noting that Justice Brennan taking issue with Justice Scalia’s
characterization of the history of tag jurisdiction by stating “for much of the 19th century, American courts
did not uniformly recognize the concept of transient jurisdiction, and it appears that the transient rule did
not receive wide currency until well after our decision in Pennoyer v. Neff . . . “).
60. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 636–37 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 637–38.
62. Id. at 638.
63. Id. at 638–39.
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Justice Scalia, in a different portion of his opinion joined by only two other
Justices,64 strongly defended relying entirely on tradition in determining the validity
of jurisdictional rules. He argued that Justice Brennan’s proposal was overly
subjective and would essentially come down to “each Justice’s subjective assessment
of what is fair and just.”65 Instead, Justice Scalia concluded that “[t]he ‘contemporary
notions of due process’ applicable to personal jurisdiction are the enduring
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ established as the test by
International Shoe” and that this test is satisfied whenever lower courts “adhere[] to
jurisdictional rules that are generally applied and have always been applied in the
United States.”66
Justice Stevens deprived either side of a majority-making fifth vote67 with
a brief enigmatic concurrence that expressed concern about the “unnecessarily broad
reach” of both primary opinions.68
None of the opinions discussed any distinctions between natural persons
and corporations, except for one footnote in Justice Scalia’s opinion:
We have said that “[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise
out of or relate to the foreign corporation’s activities in the forum
State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are
sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”
Our only holding supporting that statement, however, involved
“regular service of summons upon [the corporation’s] president
while he was in [the forum State] acting in that capacity.” See
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440,
72 S.Ct. 413, 415, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). It may be that whatever
special rule exists permitting “continuous and systematic”
contacts, id., at 438, 72 S.Ct., at 414, to support jurisdiction with
respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum applies only to
corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a
jurisdictional regime based primarily upon “de facto power over
the defendant’s person.” We express no views on these matters—

64. Id. at 608–609 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined this portion of
Justice Scalia’s opinion).
65. Id. at 623.
66. Id. at 622–23.
67. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring) (joining Justice Scalia’s opinion in substantial part, but also
writing a separate concurrence (for himself only), suggesting that he believes the Court may have authority
to declare traditionally accepted procedures invalid under the Due Process Clause, but only where there
has been a showing “that as a general proposition the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common sense in
so many instances that it should be held violative of due process in every case”).
68. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Mays, supra note 37, at 1278 n.68 (describing Justice
Stevens’ concurrence in Burnham as “a short and somewhat enigmatic opinion”); see also Winton D.
Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court: New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEORGE MASON U. L. REV. 199, 209 n.30
(1990) (“Justice Stevens thus continues his practice in close cases of the jurisdictional kind by refusing to
join with anybody’s theory. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).”).
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and, for simplicity’s sake, omit reference to this aspect of
“contacts”-based jurisdiction in our discussion.69
In this footnote, Justice Scalia does not really get at the central question of whether
corporations should be subject to tag jurisdiction or not, but instead suggests that
individuals may not ever be subject to general jurisdiction based on systematic and
continuous contacts outside of their home state, even though this method of asserting
jurisdiction is applicable to corporations. Thus, this footnote offers no guidance on
the relationship between tag jurisdiction and corporations and even explicitly
disclaims expressing any “views” on the issue it does purport to address.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV, infra, lower courts have frequently contorted
this footnote to avoid applying tag jurisdiction to corporations.
II. TAGGING CORPORATIONS: AN IDEA BOTH SIDES OF BURNHAM
CAN EMBRACE
Burnham does not directly answer the question of whether tag jurisdiction
applies to corporations; however, it does provide two methods of analysis to apply
to that question. As discussed above, Burnham’s two principal opinions gave
different justifications for the continuing vitality of tag jurisdiction: Justice Scalia’s
opinion relied on the well-established historical pedigree of tag jurisdiction, while
Justice Brennan relied on the inherent fairness of tag jurisdiction.70 While these
methods of analysis are worlds apart when it comes to their larger implications for
the Due Process Clause, they should both yield the same result here: tag jurisdiction
should apply to business entities just as it applies to individuals.
A.

Historical Justifications

Under Justice Scalia’s method of analysis in Burnham, to determine
whether a procedure for securing personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process
Clause, courts must look to “the principles traditionally followed by American courts
in marking out the territorial limits of each State’s authority.”71 The most “crucial
time” for the purposes of establishing what principals were “traditionally followed”
by American courts with respect to personal jurisdiction is the period around “1868,
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”72 Under this originalist approach,
as long as a practice was common around the time of ratification, it is constitutional,
even if the practice was less common prior to the ratification period.73 If a practice
is sufficiently “traditional” by this metric, then no further analysis is necessary and
due process is satisfied.74 However, if a practice is not so traditional, then it must be
justified by an analysis of whether it comports with “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”75
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1 (some citations omitted).
See supra Part II.B.
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609.
Id. at 611.
See id. at 609–16.
Id. at 622.
Id.
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Applying this test to the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations
shows that this practice—although not as old as asserting tag jurisdiction over
individual defendants—was, in fact, fairly common at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification. By that time, courts had already been engaged in several
decades of expansion of jurisdiction over out of state corporations. This expansion
went on two tracks. One is a familiar one where if a corporation conducted a
sufficient amount of business in a state, it was considered “present” there for
purposes of jurisdiction.
The other method is less well known, but was equally part of jurisdiction
jurisprudence at that time: the idea that a corporation was subject to a forum’s
jurisdiction if its agent was served while engaged in corporate business there. This
latter line of reasoning—present in several cases both before and after ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment—places the assertion of tag jurisdiction over
corporations among those methods of acquiring personal jurisdiction “traditionally
followed” by American courts under Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion.
1.

Corporations Leave Home

Early in American history, corporations for the most part, were deemed to
be present for jurisdictional purposes in only one place: their place of incorporation.76
However, as interstate commerce and the role of corporations in American society
grew, courts expanded the concept of corporate presence further, to prevent the
inequitable result of allowing a corporation to do business in and utilize the courts
of other fora without subjecting corporations to personal jurisdiction in those fora.77
One line of cases expanded the concept of corporate presence into what
eventually became the International Shoe minimum contacts test. These cases
analogized “doing business” in a state to the corporation being present in a state.78
This was the beginning of the idea of constructive presence; if a corporation was
conducting a certain level of commerce in a state, it could be considered “present”

76. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 354 (1882) (“Formerly it was held that a foreign
corporation could not be sued in an action for the recovery of a personal demand outside of the state by
which it was chartered.”); Middlebrooks v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 301, 305 (1841) (“By the
common law, there is no process which can be served . . . upon foreign corporations, by which their
appearance can be compelled in any court; for the reason, that [such corporations have] no corporate
existence within [the state]. . . .”); GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77–79 (1918) (“Until toward the middle of the
[nineteenth] century, the idea seems to have been widely prevalent that foreign attachment was the only
process available against [non-resident corporations]. . . .”); see also Steven Mathew Wald, Note, The
Left-for-Dead Fiction of Corporate “Presence”: Is It Revived by Burnham?, 54 LA. L. REV. 187, 188
(1993) (footnote omitted) (“At the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, corporations were deemed to be present at
their place of incorporation.”).
77. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 76, at 188–89; J.P.T., Annotation, Service of Process upon Agent of
Foreign Corporation in Action Based on Transactions Outside the State, 30 AM. L. REP. 255 (1924)
(citations omitted) (“Following the rule of the common law the early American cases held that a
corporation was suable only in the courts of the sovereignty by which it was created. The rule was
established at a time when the law relating to municipal corporations applied also to private corporations;
the rule obviously could not maintain itself after the enormous growth of private corporations, and the
extension of corporate activity into foreign jurisdictions.”).
78. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 21, at 621–22, 622 nn.56–58.
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for jurisdictional purposes whether or not one of its agents was served while
physically present in the forum.79
However, another distinct line of reasoning expanded the concept of
corporate presence based on the physical presence of corporate agents. This line of
reasoning arose in conjunction with the relatively new idea that corporations could
act at all outside of their place of incorporation.80 These courts held that a corporation
could be considered physically present for service of process purposes when one of
its agents was conducting business on the corporation’s behalf in the forum. Such
service was then sufficient to give courts of the forum personal jurisdiction over the
corporation. Although this line of cases is often conflated with the rise of the
constructive presence theory, they actually represent an entirely distinct way of
asserting jurisdiction over corporations: One based on traditional notions of
territorial power. These cases reflect that asserting tag jurisdiction over corporations
is nearly as firmly rooted in our legal history as asserting tag jurisdiction over
individuals.
As early as 1838, some courts were already asserting personal jurisdiction
over corporations outside of their place of incorporation—and doing so on the basis
of in-state service. In Libbey v. Hodgdon,81 the New Hampshire Superior Court of
Judicature82 allowed the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
corporation based on service on one of that corporation’s employees while in the
forum state on the corporation’s behalf.83 The court’s reasoning drew a direct parallel
to the assertion of tag jurisdiction over natural persons:
If a citizen of another state is found here, and process is served on
him personally, that gives the court jurisdiction. It may well be
doubted, however, whether the casual presence of the principal
officer of a foreign corporation here, and service upon him, would
be sufficient. But if the corporation have estate here — or if it send
its officer, upon whom by our law process is to be served, to reside
here and transact business upon its account, we see not why an
attachment of such estate, or service upon such officer, may not be
sufficient.84
Thus, although service during a “casual visit”—that is, one for purposes unconnected
to the corporation—by an officer to a state might be insufficient to confer
jurisdiction, service during a visit made for the purpose of conducting corporate
business is as valid a vehicle for asserting personal jurisdiction over the corporation
as in-state service on an individual.

79. See id. at 622 & n.61.
80. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of
Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 136 & n.40, 137 & n.48 (2013); see also infra Part V.
81. 9 N.H. 394 (1838).
82. See Charles G. Douglas, III & Jay Surdukowski, The New Hampshire Supreme Court: A History
of Change, N.H.B.J., Winter 2010, at 10, 11 (describing the New Hampshire Superior Court of Judicature
as New Hampshire’s highest appellate court in 1838).
83. Libbey, 9 N.H. at 396–97.
84. Id.
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Decades later, in 1870, after a few more courts had followed suit,85 the
United States Supreme Court also began allowing the assertion of jurisdiction over
non-resident corporations based on service of process upon corporate agents. That
year, the Court decided Railroad Co. v. Harris,86 where it allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation in the District of Columbia, where the
corporation’s president was served in the District.87 Arguably, there is some
ambiguity as to whether in-forum service was critical to the Court’s analysis since
the Court also observed that the corporation was conducting business in the District
(by running a railroad there) and that the statute authorizing the corporation’s
operation in the District impliedly required that the corporation be amenable to suit
there.88 Nevertheless, the Court was squarely presented with the argument that
service on the corporation’s president was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the
corporation and rejected it without the benefit of the “minimum contacts” analysis,
which was still several decades away.89 Moreover, although Harris was not a
constitutional case, it strongly suggests that the Court saw no constitutional problem
with exercising jurisdiction in this manner since it was decided just two years after
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.90
2.

The Difference Between Constructive & Actual Presence

After Pennoyer, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of asserting
personal jurisdiction over corporations through its agents more explicitly in St. Clair
v. Cox.91 There, the Court held that the rule announced in Pennoyer applied equally
to the assertion of personal jurisdiction over corporations.92 However, the Court
noted that there was one key difference between corporations and natural persons:
“[a] corporation, being an artificial being, can act only through agents, and only
through them can be reached, and process must, therefore, be served upon them.”93
Although the Court acknowledged that historically corporate officers could only
receive service of process on behalf of the corporation in the state of incorporation,
the Court approved the requirement that a corporation appoint an agent to accept
service of process, as a condition of doing business in a state.94 The Court reasoned
85. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Savage Mining Co., 23 F. Cas. 1113, 1123 (C.C.D. Nev. 1867) (No.
13,986) (“If the corporation exercise powers in this state, it must do so through an officer or agent. If this
officer or agent be competent to represent the corporation here in making contracts and holding property,
why may he not be said to represent it when the enforcement of its liabilities is sought?”).
86. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65 (1870).
87. Id. at 69, 71, 83–84.
88. See id. at 83–84.
89. See id. at 71, 83–84.
90. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 612–13 (citing many cases that pre-dated Pennoyer and that do not
explicitly invoke constitutional limitations on jurisdiction, but rather rely on general common law and/or
statutory principles); see also id. at 609 (“American courts invalidated, or denied recognition to,
judgments [where the court lacked personal jurisdiction] long before the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted.”) (collecting cases); supra note 12 (noting that in the years immediately following Pennoyer, not
all courts understood it as establishing the broad constitutional rule it is known for today).
91. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
92. Id. at 353.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 355–56.
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that “[s]erving process on [a corporation’s] agents in other states, for matters within
the sphere of their agency, is, in effect, servicing process on it as much so as if such
agents resided in the state where it was created.”95 Although the Court was approving
a narrower consent-based practice, its acknowledgement that a corporation can
“travel” for jurisdictional purposes from its home to another state by sending its agent
there supports applying tag jurisdiction to corporations.
Crucially, although the Court in St. Clair makes reference to the concept of
“doing business” in the forum, it did so in the context of discussing the type of agency
relationship that must exist for the proper assertion of jurisdiction, not in the context
of anything resembling a modern “contacts” analysis. The Court held—in construing
a Michigan statute authorizing service on non-resident corporate officers—that
“service upon an agent of a foreign corporation will not be deemed sufficient unless
he represents the corporation in the state. This representation implies that the
corporation does business, or has business in the state for the transaction of which it
sends or appoints an agent there.”96 Thus, the Court was not asserting that a certain
quantum of “business” must be conducted in the forums for the court to acquire
jurisdiction, but rather that the agent of the corporation who is served in the forum
must be there for the purpose of conducting some kind of corporate business in the
forum.
Although St. Clair involved a statute requiring the appointment of an agent,
the existence of such a statute was not required to hale a corporation into court based
on in-state service on a corporate agent doing business in a forum. The South
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Lipe v. Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio Railway
Co.97is illustrative of this point. There, the court allowed the assertion of jurisdiction
over a non-resident corporation when its employees were served98 with process while
doing business in South Carolina, even though the corporation had never consented
to service on its agents in South Carolina and the cause of action was unrelated to
any business the corporation had conducted in South Carolina.99 The defendant relied
upon a line of cases which held that a corporation that was only constructively
present in a jurisdiction (i.e., subject to service via a statutory requirement)100 was
only amenable to suit for causes of action that were related to the corporation’s
activities within the state.101 The court rejected that argument, and in doing so
illustrated the key difference between the constructive presence doctrine and actual
presence:

95. Id. at 356.
96. Id. at 358–59 (emphasis added); see also Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d
Cir. 1930) (“The shareholders, officers and agents are not individually the corporation, and do not carry
it with them in all their legal transactions. It is only when engaged upon its affairs that they can be said to
represent it, and we can see no qualitative distinction between one part of its doings and another, so they
carry out the common plan. If we are to attribute locality to it at all, it must be equally present wherever
any part of its work goes on, as much in the little as in the great.”).
97. 116 S.E. 101, 103 (S.C. 1923).
98. Id. (absenting the court noting the capacity in which the served employees were employed).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 102–03 (requiring that a corporation either be amenable to service via a statutorily appointed
agent or a state official).
101. Id.
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But we are concerned here, not with the constructive presence of
the defendant corporation, but with its actual presence in the state;
not with the effect of service of process upon constructive agents,
but upon actual agents within the jurisdiction of the court issuing
the process. . . . In that state of the facts it is wholly immaterial
whether the defendant had complied with statutory requirements
as to designating an agent upon whom process could be
served[.]102
Thus, Lipe makes clear that when a corporation sends its agents into a forum to do
business, the corporation is actually present in that forum, not just constructively
present based on theories of consent or compliance with statutory requirements.103
Other courts reached similar conclusions in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, equating sending an agent to do business in a forum with the
corporation’s actual presence in that forum. For example, in Mohr & Mohr Distilling
Co. v. Insurance Cos.,104 the Southern District of Ohio upheld the exercise of
jurisdiction over a non-resident insurance company whose agents were served while
physically present and doing business in Ohio, reasoning that such activity
“constituted [the insurance company] personally within the district, in such a sense
as that [it] may be said to be found by process when issued against [it] and served on
these agents.”105 Similarly, in Memphis & Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Pikey, the Indiana
Supreme Court allowed the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-Indiana riverboat
transportation company based on service in Indiana upon two wharf masters of the
company.106 The court noted that the wharf masters were “agents of [the]
defendant . . . who received and discharged freight for defendant, and who made
contracts [in the cities where they were served] for and on account of defendant. . . .
“107
Just like in St. Clair, in each of these cases the key to the jurisdictional
inquiry was not that the defendant was “doing business” in the forum at issue in some
generalized sense, but rather the inquiry turned on whether the defendant’s agent was
doing the corporation’s business when he was served with process in the forum, such
102. Id. at 103.
103. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 107–108, 112–13 (1898) (affirming the exercise of
jurisdiction by a federal court in New York over a corporation based in Great Britain based on service of
the corporation’s agent in New York even though New York had no statute requiring that foreign
corporations operating in New York be amenable to such service, making even clearer the validity of
acquiring jurisdiction by service upon an agent of a foreign corporation independent of a statute
establishing some kind of required consent); see also Brown v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 18 F.2d 677, 678
(W.D. La. 1927) (“Even in the absence of a specific statute of the particular state or jurisdiction where the
suit is brought, if the foreign corporation is doing business in that particular place, it can be brought into
court through service upon its president, although the cause of action arises in another state.”); Moch v.
Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 10 F. 696, 700 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1882) (“That a corporation doing business in a
state other than that from which its charter is derived . . . through the agency of natural persons- may be
sued and brought into court in that state by the service of process on its agent there, independently of any
statute law or warrant of attorney expressly authorizing such service, has been very authoritatively
decided.”).
104. 12 F. 474 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882).
105. Id. at 475–76 (emphasis added).
106. 40 N.E. 527, 530 (Ind. 1895).
107. Id.
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that the agent’s presence could render the defendant itself present in the forum.108
Thus, when a corporation sends such agents into a forum to do business, “it stands
on the same footing with a natural person” with respect to jurisdiction and service.109
An important corollary principal is that the person acting as the “agent” of
the corporation in the state must be more than an “agent” in the broad legal sense of
the term. Instead, the person must have some authority over the business operations
of the corporation, either because they are an officer, or because they are delegated
that authority as a “managing agent.” 110 This limitation is necessary because an agent
who is delegated a discrete task cannot be said to represent the corporation in such a
way that establishes the corporation’s actual presence in a forum.111
108. Cf. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265–66, 268 (1917) (refusing to
uphold the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation where the corporation’s president was
served while in the forum “engaged exclusively on personal matters unconnected with the company’s
affairs” and the company did no other business in the forum). The fact that courts of this era were applying
tag jurisdiction to corporations is even more evident in cases that applied a version of tag jurisdiction to
intra-state disputes where corporate officers were served within a county different from the one where the
corporation was based. See Badger Oil Co. v. Clay, 200 P. 433, 435 (Okla. 1921) (“The president of this
company was served with summons in Grady county. He was there voluntarily, not induced to come to
Grady county by any artifice, trick, or fraud, nor was he there in attendance on court or in obeyance to
any subpœna. Under the statute, the service upon the president was service upon the corporation, and,
being regularly served with summons, the court had jurisdiction.”).
109. Merchants’ Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 13 F. 358, 359 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); see also N.
Missouri R.R. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 453, 469–70 (1868) (“A natural person, who goes into another State,
carries along with him all his personal liabilities, and if a corporation chooses to exercise its power in
another state, it ought of necessity to become amenable to its laws. . . .”); Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life &
Fire Ins. Co., 25 N.J.L. 57, 65–66 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1855) (Elmer, J.) (rejecting a collateral attack on the
judgment of a New York court entered against a New Jersey corporation which had previously conducted
business in New York but had ceased doing so whose president was served while in New York for reasons
unrelated to the corporation); Id. (One Justice’s opinion argued that the president “having been once
avowedly sent into the state upon [the corporation’s] business, it requires no straining to hold, that if
afterwards in the state at all, he ought to be considered as still clothed with his official character, so far as
the business formerly transacted therein is concerned.”); Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y.
137, 139–40 (1881) (affirming the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation based on
service upon its president while in the forum “for purposes of his own, on his way to a seaside resort, and
not in his official capacity or upon any business of the defendant” because once the president was served
“it became his duty, as its officer, to take notice of the commencement of the suit, or to convey such notice
in some proper way to the defendant; and that he would do so could reasonably be presumed and
expected”).
110. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Atchison, 34 F. 286, 289–90 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation when the employee served “was not an officer and managing
agent, or even a ticket agent of the company[,] had no independent office or place of business, . . . [and]
[h]is authority was limited to soliciting business . . . “); see also Honerine Mining & Milling Co. v.
Tallerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 88 P. 9, 11 (Utah 1906) (holding that an agent served with process “must
at least belong to that class of agents who have been appointed by the corporation to represent it in its
business affairs, or who are by it recognized as its agents, and intrusted [sic] with some of its property
which in some way has connection with its general business affairs” in order for service to be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction).
111. This illustrates yet another difference between the physical presence analysis these courts were
engaging in and the constructive presence analysis that became modern minimum contacts jurisprudence.
The actions of a corporation’s agents without substantial authority could certainly contribute to a finding
that a corporation is constructively present in a jurisdiction via minimum contacts. See, e.g., Mesalic v.
Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The contacts at issue here . . . [including] substantial
repairs by [the defendant’s employees] in New Jersey on two occasions . . . properly come under what the
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Cases Conflating Constructive & Actual Presence

To be sure, not every case from this era points in the same direction. Some
contemporary courts conflated the concept of constructive presence and actual
presence by requiring both that an agent be present in the state and that the defendant
conduct some quantum of business above and beyond the business being conducted
by that agent.112 After the turn of the century, this confusion led to some courts
explicitly rejecting the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations; instead,
replacing it entirely with the doctrine of constructive presence based on business
related contacts.113
The most prominent rejections of tag jurisdiction over corporations during
this period were the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rosenberg Brothers & Company
v. Curtis Brown Company114 and Consolidated Textile Corporation v. Gregory.115 In
Rosenberg, the Court rejected New York’s assertion of jurisdiction over an
Oklahoma company when the company’s president was served while purchasing
supplies on the company’s behalf in New York.116 In Consolidated Textile, the Court
rejected Wisconsin’s assertion of jurisdiction over an out of state company where the
president was served while in Wisconsin for the purpose of negotiating on the
company’s behalf in settlement talks related to the dispute that gave rise to the
lawsuit before the Court.117 In both cases, the Court found that even though the
officers were served in the forum, the corporate defendants were not “doing
business” there and therefore could not be subject to the state’s jurisdiction.118
Both cases were decided with almost no supporting analysis, and neither
provides much modern support for exempting corporations from tag jurisdiction.
Consolidated Textile has mostly been cited in subsequent years for its unrelated
holding that a subsidiary’s contacts with a forum ordinarily cannot be imputed to the

Supreme Court describes as contacts ‘that create a substantial connection with the forum state.’ The
connection was one in which [the defendant], through its mechanics, availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in New Jersey.”) (citation omitted).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 29 F. 17, 35 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886) (“[T]hree
conditions must concur or co-exist in order to give the federal courts jurisdiction in personam over a
corporation created without the territorial limits of the state in which the court is held, viz.: (1) It must
appear as a matter of fact that the corporation is carrying on its business in such foreign state or district;
(2) that such business is transacted or managed by some agent or officer appointed by and representing
the corporation in such state; and (3) the existence of some local law making such corporation, or foreign
corporations generally, amendable to suit there as a condition, express or implied, of doing business in
the state.”).
113. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917–18 (1917) (“Unless a foreign
corporation is engaged in business within the state, it is not brought within the state by the presence of its
agents.”); Nelson v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 5 Alaska 59, 61–62 (D. Alaska 1914) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (“It is said . . . that by a long and unbroken line of decisions in the federal courts it has
been held that, when a foreign corporation ‘does no business within the state, service upon an officer or
agent of such corporation, temporarily within the jurisdiction upon private business of his own and on
that of the corporation, will not bind the corporation.”).
114. 260 U.S. 516 (1923).
115. 289 U.S. 85 (1933).
116. 260 U.S. at 517–18.
117. 289 U.S. at 87–88.
118. Id. at 88; Rosenberg, 260 U.S. at 518.
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parent corporation.119 Similarly, Rosenberg has only been relied on for the idea that
a few isolated transactions are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the
minimum contacts analysis, not its apparent rejection of tag jurisdiction.120 Tellingly,
no court rejecting the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations after Burnham
has cited either Consolidated Textile or Rosenberg to support its argument.
In any event, Consolidated Textile and Rosenberg were decided long after
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and therefore, under Justice Scalia’s
methodology in Burnham, are not as persuasive on the question of whether the
assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations is consistent with due process as earlier
cases.121 Instead of reflecting any historical practice, these cases likely represent the
confusion associated with the rise of the use of business contacts as a form of
corporate constructive presence at the same time courts were beginning to recognize
that corporations could actually move and act outside the borders of their home
states. Indeed, in another case earlier in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
seemed to imply a separation between acquiring jurisdiction by serving an officer
present in a forum on corporate business and acquiring jurisdiction by measuring the
quantum of business the corporation was doing in the forum:
[T]he mere fact that an officer of a corporation may temporarily
be in the state or even permanently reside therein, if not there for
the purpose of transacting business for the corporation, or vested
with authority by the corporation to transact business in such state,
affords no basis for acquiring jurisdiction[.]122
Thus, even at that late date the Court still drew a distinction between situations where
an officer was served outside of the corporation’s home state while there for reasons
unrelated to corporate business and situations where the officer enters a forum to act
on the corporation’s behalf.123 It was not until later in cases like Consolidated Textile
and Rosenberg that the Court began to reject tag jurisdiction over corporations by
erroneously absorbing it into what would become minimum contacts analysis.
119. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 n.* (1988); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984).
120. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 417–18; Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). See Dynamo v. Warehouse of Vending & Games, 168 F. Supp.
2d 616, 620 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 n.12) (calling into question even
this aspect of Rosenberg’s holding when it comes to specific jurisdiction). Although the Supreme Court
has suggested that the continuing validity of Rosenberg with respect to an assertion of specific jurisdiction
might be questioned, it has not yet addressed that issue.
121. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611. Disregarding early twentieth century Supreme Court cases in
favor of nineteenth century judicial trends is a familiar outcome of an originalist approach to constitutional
analysis. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 983–85, 990–94 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality) (rejecting
a 1910 Supreme Court case approving Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis in part by relying on
nineteenth century cases rejecting such analysis).
122. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195.
123. See also Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S. 518, 521–22 (1895) (“[A] judgment
rendered in a court of one state, against a corporation neither incorporated nor doing business within the
state, must be regarded as of no validity in the courts of another state, or of the United States, unless
service of process was made in the first state upon an agent appointed to act there for the corporation, and
not merely upon an officer or agent residing in another state, and only casually within the state, and not
charged with any business of the corporation there.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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*****
Therefore, under Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham, because in-state
service on an officer engaged in corporate business was an accepted way to obtain
personal jurisdiction over corporations at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification, tag jurisdiction should be valid today under the Due Process Clause.124
B.

Fairness Justifications

Under Justice Brennan’s Burnham opinion, every method of asserting
personal jurisdiction “must comport with contemporary notions of due process.”125
The factors Justice Brennan considered that drove him to conclude that tag
jurisdiction was generally126 consistent with contemporary notions of due process,
were (1) the reasonable expectations of defendants, (2) whether defendants avail
themselves of the benefits of the fora, and (3) whether there is a great burden on
defendants in having to litigate in the fora.127 All of these factors strongly support
the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations, perhaps even more so than they
do the assertion of such jurisdiction over individual defendants.
1.

Corporations Should Reasonably Expect To Be Subject To
Jurisdiction In Fora Where Executives Travel To Conduct Corporate
Business

Justice Brennan concluded that individual defendants should reasonably
expect to be subject to jurisdiction in any forum where they travel because
“American courts have announced the rule for perhaps a century” which “provides a
defendant voluntarily present in a particular State today clear notice that [he] is
subject to suit in the forum.”128 Applying this justification to corporations is difficult
because there is a question about the level of generality at which the “rule” is defined:
if the rule is tag jurisdiction in general, then corporations would be subject to the
same level of notice as everyone else, but if the rule is tag jurisdiction as applied to
individuals, then corporations would need to be on some kind of separate notice that
tag jurisdiction applies to entities. Assuming the latter method of defining the rule,
124. Another part of Justice Scalia’s opinion does suggest that even traditional practices may be
subject to invalidity (or at least closer scrutiny) if the method of obtaining jurisdiction has been abandoned
by most states. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622. However, although the validity of asserting tag jurisdiction
over corporations has not been analyzed by many contemporary state court decisions, many state statutes
allow for in-state service on out-of-state corporations by virtue of serving a corporate officer who happens
to be present in the state. See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 807 n.2. See also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1068 n.12 (collecting citations to
states with long-arm statutes extending to the limits of what is allowable under the federal Constitution).
125. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 632 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
126. The only situations in which Justice Brennan suggested such an exercise may not be valid are
cases where the defendant was brought to the forum involuntarily. See id. at 637 n.11. Of course, this
exception has long been a feature of tag jurisdiction. See id. at 613 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (noting that in
the nineteenth century, “[m]ost States . . . had statutes or common-law rules that exempted from service
of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or fraud, or who were there as a party or
witness in unrelated judicial proceedings.”) (citations omitted).
127. See id. at 635–39 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
128. Id. at 636–37 (quotations and citation omitted).
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although there are some courts that have applied tag jurisdiction to corporations at
some periods in American history, it would be difficult to argue that courts have
applied it to corporations with the same consistency as they have to individuals.
However, there are other reasons corporations should reasonably expect to be subject
to jurisdiction in forums where their officers travel to conduct business.
First, many state statutes require corporations to appoint an in-state agent
to receive service of process as a condition of doing business in those fora.129 Courts
have long approved these statutes on the theory that “[w]hen [a corporation] avails
itself of the privileges of doing business in a state whose laws authorize it to be sued
there by service of process upon an agent, its assent to that mode of service is
implied.”130 This consent justification could just as easily serve as a notice
justification in this context. If a corporation sends an officer to conduct business in
a forum with a statute authorizing service on that officer, it would be reasonable for
the corporation to be aware that it may be subject to jurisdiction in that forum.
Second, corporations are more likely to be familiar with the laws of a state
where it sends an officer to do business than an individual defendant simply traveling
to a different state. Some corporations are highly sophisticated companies with
legions of in house and external lawyers at their disposal for the express purpose of
investigating every possible legal risk those companies face131 Obviously, for one of
those companies it would be much easier to anticipate where it might be subject to
jurisdiction when deciding where to send its officers to conduct business than it
would be for an ordinary person making travel plans.132
Of course, not all corporations are huge conglomerates. But, even the
smallest of corporations has to demonstrate minimal familiarity with the legal system
to bring itself into existence. Setting up a corporation requires registration with the
state in the form of filing articles of incorporation that comply with statutory
requirements and obtaining a certificate of incorporation.133 It can also require the
filing of other documents “such as underwriting agreements, stock subscription
agreements, registration statements required by federal and state securities laws, and
reservation and registration of corporate name forms.”134 The same is true for other
entities such as limited liability companies which have to file compliant articles of
organization with state government officials.135 Thus, even the smallest of
corporations, by their very existence, have demonstrated more familiarity with the

129. See 18 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 8728.
130. See, e.g., Merchants’ Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 11 Abb. N. Cas. 183, 13 F. 358, 359
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
131. Indeed, a disproportionate number of major corporate CEOs—and probably other officers—are
lawyers themselves. See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 7
n.8
(HLS
Program
on
the
Legal
Profession
Research
Paper
No.
2013-6),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585.
132. Cf. Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 743, 770–73 (2015) (describing the inherent advantages corporations have over natural persons in
litigation).
133. See, e.g., 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 129, 137–46, 166 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010).
134. See, e.g., id. § 135.
135. See, e.g., id. § 137.
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legal system than the average natural person and, therefore, are more likely to be on
notice of the implications of sending an officer to another forum to conduct business.
Thus, even aside from their awareness of the general validity of tag
jurisdiction, the existence of state statutes authorizing service on foreign
corporations through their officers, combined with corporations’ inherent increased
awareness of legal risks, makes it reasonable for corporations to anticipate being
subject to tag jurisdiction.136
2.

Corporations Avail Themselves Of Forum Benefits When They Send
Officers Into Fora To Conduct Corporate Business

The second factor on which Justice Brennan relied in approving tag
jurisdiction was the benefits that even transient visitors obtain from visiting other
states. He noted that a visitor to a state has his or her “health and safety . . .
guaranteed by the State’s police, fire, and emergency medical services[,] . . . is free
to travel on the State’s roads and waterways [and] likely enjoys the fruits of the
State’s economy as well.”137 The opinion also relied on the protection the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV offers to out of state residents from
discrimination in access to other state’s courts.138 Justice Brennan argued that
without tag jurisdiction “an asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the full
benefit of the power of the forum State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining
immunity from their authority as a defendant.”139
A corporation sending its officer into a state enjoys all of these benefits and
much more. Not only does the corporation—through its traveling officer—enjoy the
benefits of the emergency personnel and transportation routes Justice Brennan listed,
the corporation almost certainly will in some capacity or another enjoy “the fruits of
the state’s economy.” This is because tag jurisdiction can only be asserted over a
corporation when the officer is traveling into the forum in order to do something on
the corporation’s behalf.140 This is in contrast to an individual defendant who may
enter a forum for any number of non-economic reasons.141 Thus, the corporation
sending its officer into a forum will usually derive more benefits from the forum than
a transient individual defendant.
Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not apply
to corporations, corporations nevertheless are protected from irrational
discrimination when traveling to other states by the Equal Protection Clause of the

136. Of course, this factor is in some sense circular since if the Supreme Court or additional circuit
courts and state supreme courts were to declare tag jurisdiction applicable to corporations that would
obviously heighten corporations’ awareness of the likelihood of being subject to tag jurisdiction. Cf.
Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 625 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“Justice Brennan’s long
journey is a circular one, leaving him, at the end of the day, in complete reliance upon the very factor he
sought to avoid: The existence of a continuing tradition is not enough, fairness also must be considered;
fairness exists here because there is a continuing tradition.”).
137. Id. at 637–38 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
138. Id. at 638.
139. Id.
140. See supra Part III.A.
141. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 971 P.2d 220, 220–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (asserting tag
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who entered the state to visit his children and friends).
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Fourteenth Amendment.142 They also enjoy a further constitutional protection not
enjoyed—or at least not enjoyed to the same degree—by individuals: the protection
of the dormant Commerce Clause.143 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
provides a strong bar against states treating businesses based outside of their borders
differently from local businesses. This protection facilitates the operation of
corporations across state lines — a protection that corporations take direct advantage
of when they send an officer to another state to conduct business on their behalf.
Finally, corporate immunity to tag jurisdiction also would create substantial
“asymmetry,” but of a far more insidious kind than what Justice Brennan was
concerned with in Burnham. Just like natural persons could in the absence of tag
jurisdiction, corporations could freely enter other fora and utilize their courts while
retaining immunity from the authority of those courts as defendants. But, exempting
corporations from tag jurisdiction after Burnham also would create an even greater
asymmetry — corporations would be able to travel freely in other jurisdictions
without subjecting themselves to jurisdiction while natural persons would not. The
inherent unfairness of this discrepancy is obvious. When a natural person can be
subject to personal jurisdiction for such unplanned “visits” to a state such as being
on a plane that stops in a state to refuel,144 being on a ship that docks in a state’s
port,145 or even being on a flying plane that happens to be passing over the state,146
it would be unfair if a corporation’s calculated decision to send an officer into a
forum to conduct corporate business carried no jurisdictional consequences.
3.

The Burden On Corporations To Litigate In Fora Where Officers Are
Tagged Is Minor

The final factor that drove Justice Brennan to find tag jurisdiction consistent
with contemporary notions of due process was that the burdens on the defendant to
litigate in a forum in which he has already traveled “are slight.”147 In support of that
conclusion, Justice Brennan pointed out that “[m]odern transportation and
communications have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend

142. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 656, 667–68
(1981). Moreover, the rule barring corporations from protection under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause has been subject to consistent criticism since at least the early twentieth century. See Brian Kalb,
Comment, Unincorporated Businesses Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J.
585, 585 n.3 (2001) (collecting sources).
143. Under the dormant commerce clause doctrine:
[t]he Commerce Clause operates as an implicit restraint on state authority, even
in the absence of conflicting federal statute. In a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the court must inquire whether the challenged law discriminates against
interstate commerce, in which case the law is virtually per se invalid, and
survives only if it advances legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Absent discrimination
against interstate commerce, the law is upheld unless the burden imposed on
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits.
James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d Art. 1, § 2 (2009).
144. See In re Gonzalez, 993 S.W.2d 147, 151–52 (Tex. App. 1999).
145. See Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 222 (1870).
146. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443, 448 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
147. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990).
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himself in a State outside his place of residence,” that the defendant’s presence in
the forum for service was “an indication that suit in the forum likely would not be
prohibitively inconvenient[,]” and that “any burdens that do arise can be ameliorated
by a variety of procedural devices” such as motions to dismiss and inexpensive forms
of discovery that can be conducted over great distances.148
All of these reasons offered by Justice Brennan apply (at least) equally to
corporations. Modern methods of transportation and communication have obviously
become even more helpful in litigating cases across state lines than they were in 1990
when Burnham was decided. A corporation’s decision to send an officer into a forum
to conduct business also indicates—probably more than a natural person’s fortuitous
presence might—that the corporation has the ability to defend itself in that forum
without undue inconvenience. Finally, the same procedural devices that help natural
persons litigate at great distances are equally available to corporations.149
At least two other factors also lessen the burden on corporations to litigate
in fora where their officers are tagged. First, corporations usually cannot appear pro
se,150 and therefore will need to hire an attorney to represent them in court no matter
where a case is litigated. Thus, unlike a natural person, a corporation’s officers do
not need to travel for the purpose of appearing to defend the corporation in court in
a distant forum. Second, the traditional safeguards against tag jurisdiction being
unfairly applied to individuals would also apply to corporations acting through their
officers: a corporation would not be subject to tag jurisdiction under circumstances
where the corporate officer’s presence in the forum was not voluntary or was
compelled by judicial process.151
To be sure, there will certainly be some burdens associated with a
corporation having to litigate in a forum that is not its home and with which it might
not have any significant contacts other than the officer’s trip that triggered the
exercise of jurisdiction. However, as one court put it in 1882, “every natural person
who journeys through these states is liable to a similar hardship, and I am not
persuaded that the hardship is likely to be so great that such a condition is to be
pronounced unreasonable, or that any rule of public policy forbids it.”152
******
It may be questionable whether the idea of tag jurisdiction is actually
consistent with contemporary notions of fairness as Justice Brennan argued.153

148. Id. at 638–39, 639 n.13 (citations and quotations omitted).
149. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 745–46 (noting the advantage to corporate defendants
provided by procedural barriers to actions such as dispositive motions).
150. See, e.g., 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 796 (2007).
151. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas & P. Ry. Co, 18 F.2d 677, 681(W.D. La. 1927) (“There is no issue here
of the president of the defendant company having been fraudulently induced to enter the jurisdiction of
this court, or that he was compelled to appear by judicial process, such as summons or the defense or
prosecution of other litigation. So far as the record shows, he was voluntarily in the city of Shreveport,
and presumably upon business of the defendant corporation.”).
152. Carstairs v. Mechs.’ & Traders’ Ins. Co., 13 F. 823, 826 (C.C.D. Md. 1882).
153. See Freer, supra note 27, at 577–78; Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be
Done Insane? A Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, an Explanation of
Why Transient Presence Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction
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However, in a post-Burnham world where tag jurisdiction is applicable to natural
persons, it is certainly consistent with fundamental fairness to apply tag jurisdiction
to corporations as well.
III. LOWER COURTS’ RELUCTANCE TO TAG CORPORATIONS
Despite the reasoning of both Burnham opinions pointing in the direction
of imposing tag jurisdiction on corporations, lower courts have been largely reluctant
to do so.154 Instead, lower courts have offered a variety of justifications for departing
from Burnham when it comes to non-individuals. Some courts have contorted
Burnham to argue that it somehow exempted corporations from its analysis. Other
courts have pointed to the Supreme Court’s 1952 decision Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.155 as purportedly establishing that corporations are only
subject to minimum contacts analysis. At least one court has argued that preInternational Shoe case law excludes corporations from tag jurisdiction. Finally,
some courts have attempted to essentially limit Burnham to its facts or argue that tag
jurisdiction should not be applied to corporations because doing so would be bad
policy.
As the next subsection explains, each of these justifications is ultimately
unpersuasive. Moreover, as described in the following subsection, a minority of
courts have actually embraced the application of tag jurisdiction to business entities,
albeit without providing a theoretical foundation for doing so.
A.

Courts Rejecting Tag Jurisdiction Over Corporations
1.

Courts Finding Burnham Counsels Against Applying Tag
Jurisdiction to Corporations

The primary justification courts have offered for departing from tag
jurisdiction in the business entity context is that Burnham itself somehow suggested
that its holding did not apply to business entities. In Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, for
example, the Ninth Circuit held tag jurisdiction was inapplicable to corporate
defendants.156 That case, which originated in the Northern District of California,
involved four individual plaintiffs asserting product liability claims against various
defendants arising from a plane crash that occurred in Cuba.157 One of the
in a Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497, 547–52 (1991); Robert Taylor-Manning, Note, An
Easy Case Makes Bad Law-Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990), 66 WASH.
L. REV. 623, 638–39 (1991).
154. There has been almost no scholarship on this precise question since Burnham was decided. But
see Wald, supra note 76, at 202–06 (arguing that transient jurisdiction should not apply to corporations).
However, at least one influential treatise has rejected the application of tag jurisdiction to corporations.
4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1102 (3 ed.
2002) (“Service made upon a corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated association simply by
delivering process to a corporate or comparable officer who happens to reside or be physically present in
the state at the time the documents are served will not be effective to establish in personam jurisdiction,
unless that entity also is doing business so as to be amenable to service of process and the assertion of
jurisdiction in the forum state.”).
155. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
156. 764 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014).
157. Id. at 1064–65.
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defendants, a French aviation company called Avions de Transport Régional
(“ATR”), had limited contacts with the state of California (and no contacts related to
the crash).158 The plaintiffs served a copy of the summons and complaint on ATR’s
Vice President of Marketing while he was in California attending a conference on
ATR’s behalf.159
The Ninth Circuit held that service of process on ATR’s Vice President
while he was in California on company business was insufficient to give rise to
personal jurisdiction over ATR in California.160 The court reasoned that “[a]n officer
of a corporation is not the corporation, even when the officer acts on the
corporation’s behalf. While a corporation may in some abstract sense be ‘present’
wherever its officers do business, such presence is not physical in the way
contemplated by Burnham.”161 The court also argued that the Supreme Court never
suggested tag jurisdiction applied to corporations in Burnham, and, like other courts
that have reached this conclusion, supported that proposition by citing Justice
Scalia’s footnoted observation that “corporations have never fitted comfortably in a
jurisdictional regime based primarily upon ‘de facto power over the defendant’s
person.’”162
Neither of these arguments is convincing. The first argument echoes early
twentieth century courts in conflating the distinction between constructive corporate
presence (what Martinez calls “abstract” presence) and actual corporate presence.163
Constructive presence does not turn on actual physical presence whether applied to
corporations or natural persons; instead, it depends on the overall level of contact the
defendant has with the forum (i.e., minimum contacts).164 It is quite unremarkable
that ATR sending its executive into California on one occasion was insufficient to
establish constructive presence. However, the officer’s presence in California should

158. Id.
159. Id. at 1065. This method of process is valid under California law which allows service on any
vice president of a corporation. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 416.10(b).
160. Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1067–69.
161. Id. at 1068 (citations omitted); See, e.g., Mission West Properties, L.P. v. Republic Properties
Corporation, 873 A.2d 372, 384 (2005), aff’d, Republic Properties Corp. v. Mission W. Properties, LP,
895 A.2d 1006 (2006) (arguing that Burnham cannot support jurisdiction here “because no one has ever
acted on [the defendant’s] behalf in Maryland sufficient to justify the fiction that [the defendant] has been
present in the jurisdiction.”).
162. Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1). See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of New
York v. Constr. Navale Bordeaux, No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011)
(“[T]he main plurality opinion’s only reference to foreign corporations appears to state that the Court
expresses no views ‘with respect to these matters,’—presumably whether service upon a corporate officer
is sufficient for jurisdiction without a contacts-based analysis.”); Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr.
Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, No. 07-CV-309 LAJB, 2008 WL 789925, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008)
(citing Justice Scalia’s footnote to argue that “in Burnham [tag jurisdiction] was applied only to an
individual in his individual capacity. It has not been applied to corporations.”), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
163. See supra Part III.A.3.
164. See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–24 (1957) (subjecting defendant
insurance company to personal jurisdiction in California where it had no employees in California).
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have instead established the physical presence of ATR, and thus its amenability to
tag jurisdiction.165
As for Justice Scalia’s footnote, at least a few courts have recognized that—
when read in context—it merely stands for the proposition that general jurisdiction
under International Shoe may only apply to corporations, and not to individuals.166
In other words, the footnote suggested a limit to the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over individuals because of the differences between individuals and corporations,
not a limit to the assertion of jurisdiction over corporations.
2.

Courts Arguing Perkins Precludes Exercising Tag Jurisdiction Over
Entities.

Many courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Martinez, and the Fifth Circuit
in Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corporation,167 have also argued that the
165. At least one court has argued that the presence of one partner acting on the partnership’s behalf
does not make a partnership “present” for jurisdictional purposes under the theory that a partnership has
an existence independent from the partners themselves (known as the entity theory). See Mission West,
873 A.2d at 384; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 100 (2014). However, this does not change the calculus, it merely
puts partnerships on the same footing as corporations—as independent entities that still act through their
partners and directors respectively. See 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 140 (2014); see also Donatelli v. Nat’l
Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 466 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The general rule is that jurisdiction over a partner
confers jurisdiction over the partnership. Primarily, this comes about because a partner is deemed by law
and contract to be the partnership’s general agent.”); Bowles v. Marx Hide & Tallow Co., 4 F.R.D. 297,
299 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (“Process against the partnership under its partnership name, and service on one of
the partners brings the partnership and the partnership assets before the Court.”) (collecting cases). In fact,
thinking of partnerships as entities independent from their partners may strengthen the case for the
assertion of tag jurisdiction over them because it brings them closer to the status of natural persons. See
infra, Part V.
166. See Friedfertig Family P’ship 2 v. Lofberg, CIV.A. No. 13-1546 JLL, 2013 WL 6623907, at *7
(D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2013) (“The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the ‘continuous and
systematic contacts’ standard has been applied to cases involving corporate defendants, but is not extended
to individual defendants.”) (citation omitted) report and recommendation rejected on other grounds,
CIV.A. No. 13-1546 JLL, 2013 WL 6623896 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2013); Sportrust Associates Int’l, Inc. v.
Sports Corp., 304 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Although it declined to decide the issue, the
Supreme Court has questioned whether this type of general jurisdiction can ever apply to individuals,
rather than corporations.”) (citing Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1).
167. 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992). Wenche Siemer differed from Martinez in at least one important
respect. In Wenche Siemer, the plaintiffs did not serve an officer of the corporate defendant but instead
merely served an agent designated for service of process by the company as a condition of doing business
in Texas. Id. at 181–83. Many—but not all—courts facing situations where a corporate agent registered
pursuant to state law to receive service of process was served have agreed that such service is not alone
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., WorldCare Corp. v. World Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d
341, 352–54 & n.21 (D. Conn. 2011) (following Wenche Siemer on this point and collecting other cases
doing the same); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 412–17 (Tex. App. 1997)
(same) but see Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990) (“A defendant
may voluntarily consent or submit to the jurisdiction of a court which otherwise would not have
jurisdiction over it. One of the most solidly established ways of giving such consent is to designate an
agent for service of process within the State.”) (citation omitted). Even if service on a corporate agent
required to be designated by statute is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, the same reasoning does
not necessarily apply to a corporate officer acting on the corporation’s behalf in the forum. See infra, Part
IV.3; cf. Allied Carriers Exch., Inc. v. Alliance Shippers, Inc., No. CV 98-WM-2744, 1999 WL 35363796,
at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 1999) (“As Justice Brennan explained: ‘By visiting the forum State, a transient
defendant actually ‘avail[s]’ himself, of significant benefits provided by the State.’ Where, as here, a
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Supreme Court’s decision in Perkins,168 precludes the application of tag jurisdiction
to non-individuals. In Perkins, the Court conducted an analysis of the corporate
defendant’s forum related contacts even though the plaintiffs had personally served
the defendant’s president in the forum at issue.169 Wenche Siemer and Martinez argue
this analysis in Perkins suggests that personal service on the defendant’s officer
alone was insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction.170 However, as at least one court
has pointed out, the fact that the defendant’s president in Perkins was served in the
forum and the defendant had significant contacts with the forum cuts both ways:
because the Supreme Court “found that the foreign corporation was engaged in
‘continuous and systematic’ business in Ohio, . . . the Court was not presented with
the issue of whether due process allowed transient jurisdiction over a corporation
where such extensive contacts were lacking.”171
In Mission West Properties, L.P. v. Republic Properties Corporation
(Mission West),172 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held a partnership could
not be subject to jurisdiction in Maryland based on in-state service of one of the
partners.173 The court relied in part on dicta from Perkins stating that:
[I]f an authorized representative of a foreign corporation [is]
physically present in the state of the forum and . . . engaged in
activities appropriate to accepting service or receiving notice on
its behalf, . . . there is no unfairness in subjecting that corporation
to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state through such service
of process upon that representative. This has been squarely held to
be so in a proceeding in personam against such a corporation, at
least in relation to a cause of action arising out of the
corporation’s activities within the state of the forum.174
The citation of this passage is puzzling since, if anything, the first sentence seems to
support the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations because it endorses the
idea that if an officer is physically present in the forum engaged in corporate
activities, the corporation may be subject to service through the officer. The second
sentence simply points to one example of a situation where this has been “squarely

corporation merely applies to do business in the forum state, but actually conducts no business there, it
has not actually availed itself of the benefits provided by the forum state.”) (citations omitted).
168. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
169. Id. at 438, 442–49.
170. See, e.g., Wenche Siemer, 966 F.2d at 183 (“In Perkins, the Supreme Court upheld general
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation that had been served in Ohio by serving its president while he
was conducting the corporation’s business in the state, but only after a thorough ‘minimum contacts’ and
fairness analysis.”); Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1068–69 (“If tag jurisdiction had been available, that alone
would have resolved the case. But the Court upheld jurisdiction only after deciding whether “the business
done in Ohio . . . was sufficiently substantial” to allow jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the company’s
Ohio contacts.”); See also Navale Bordeaux, No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950, at *2 (“Perkins . . .
did not hold that service in a state upon an officer of a corporation obviates the need to do a minimum
contacts analysis.”).
171. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 956 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
172. 873 A.2d 372 (2005)
173. Id. at 37–38.
174. Id. at 31 (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 444–47) (emphasis in original).
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held” to be so—in a situation where forum-based activities relate to the cause of
action. The second sentence does not offer any limitation on where the principal in
the first sentence could apply (hence the use of “at least”).
3.

Mission West: Reliance on Pre-International Shoe Cases

The Mission West court was unique in that it buttressed its argument with
what purported to be a more thorough analysis of the historical record than the other
courts reaching the same conclusion. The court based its conclusion, in part, on a
few pre-International Shoe Supreme Court cases: James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage
Co. v. Harry,175 Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co.,176 and St. Clair v. Cox.177
In James-Dickinson, the Court rejected Illinois’ exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation where its president was served in Illinois while there “on
business of the corporation.”178 In Kendall, the Court rejected New York’s assertion
of jurisdiction over a West Virginia corporation through service on the corporation’s
treasurer in New York.179 In St. Clair, the Court favorably described a Michigan case
rejecting the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant corporation
based on service of its officer who was only “casually” present in the state.180
However, other than quoting superficially supportive passages, the Mission
West court did not provide a detailed explanation of why these cases supported its
conclusion, and in fact, all of them are of little weight or distinguishable upon closer
examination. As the Mission West court admitted, the holding in James-Dickinson
was terse and supported by virtually no reasoning.181 Moreover, James-Dickenson’s
holding appears to be premised on the idea that a corporation cannot ever be subject
to jurisdiction in a place where it has no “place of business,” a proposition that is
obviously inconsistent with modern personal jurisdiction doctrine and modern
conceptions of the corporate personality.182 Finally, James-Dickenson was not
decided until 1927, many decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
and during a period where—as discussed in Part III.A.3, supra, courts erroneously
conflated the distinction between physical corporate presence and constructive
corporate presence.
Both Kendall and the Michigan case discussed in St. Clair183 involved
situations where the officers were served during a time when they were not acting

175. 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
176. 198 U.S. 477 (1905).
177. 106 U.S. 350 (1882). St. Clair is discussed in more detail in Part III.A.2.
178. 273 U.S. at 122.
179. 198 U.S. at 482–83.
180. 106 U.S. at 357–58 (citing Newell v. Great W. Ry. Co., of Canada, 19 Mich. 336 (1869)).
181. See 873 A.2d 372, 381 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (characterizing the holding in JacksonDickenson as being declared “without much discussion”).
182. See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 222–24 (subjecting defendant insurance company to personal
jurisdiction in California where it had no offices in California). See also infra Part V (discussing the
evolution of the corporate person from a creature of the state to an independent entity).
183. As discussed in supra Part III.A.2, St. Clair’s discussion of the history of the assertion of
jurisdiction over corporations actually supports the exercise of tag jurisdiction over corporations.
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on the corporation’s behalf while present in the forum.184 The question posed by an
officer who is acting on behalf of the company at the time of in-forum service is a
very different one. Tag jurisdiction has always required voluntary presence in the
forum.185 When an officer travels for reasons totally unrelated to the company, his
or her choice to enter a forum cannot be imputed to the corporation, and the
corporation cannot be said to have traveled to that forum voluntarily.186 In contrast,
when an officer is directed by the corporation to enter another forum to act on the
corporation’s behalf, the corporation is making a voluntary choice to enter the forum
that is analogous to the choice made by traveling natural persons.187
4.

Courts Giving Other Reasons For Declining To Apply Tag
Jurisdiction to Corporations

Other courts have not found any aspect of Burnham or earlier cases
controlling, but have nevertheless independently concluded that tag jurisdiction
should not be applied to corporations. For example, in C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v.
Urban Trend (HK) Ltd.,188 the president of the defendant, a corporation based in
Hong Kong, was served while attending a trade show in Chicago on behalf of the
company.189 The C.S.B. court acknowledged that Burnham “left unresolved” the
question of whether tag jurisdiction applied to corporations and—to its credit—
recognized that Justice Scalia’s footnote was not controlling since it was “made in

184. In the Michigan case discussed in St. Clair, the court explicitly recognized that the officer was
only “casually” in Michigan and not there on any business of the corporation. 106 U.S. at 357–58 (citing
Newell v. Great W. Ry. Co., of Canada, 19 Mich. 336 (1869)). In Kendall, 198 U.S. at 479, it is less clear
from the facts what the officer was doing in New York when he was served with process, but it appears
that at the time he was served the corporate defendant had effectively been defunct for several years
making it unlikely he was in New York on corporate business. See id. (“[S]ince August 10, 1901, there
had been no meeting, either of the stockholders or of the directors; and on the last-mentioned date the
stockholders were notified that the company had no funds with which to pay the franchise taxes which
were due to the state of West Virginia. . . . The sole assets of the company consisted of two automatic
looms and tools and machinery employed in the making thereof and its patents. . . . The company had no
bank account, no office force, and no employees. It had never reached the stage of the active transaction
of business[.]”).
185. See supra Part III.A.3 and note 151.
186. When an officer of an entity is served while in a forum for reasons unrelated to his or her status
as an officer, courts unsurprisingly nearly always reject the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
entity. See, e.g., Peguero y otros v. Hernandez Pellot, P.R. Offic. Trans. 14 & n.13 (Nov. 14, 1995)
(rejecting the assertion of jurisdiction over a corporation based on service of process on an officer present
in the forum for non-business reasons but explicitly declining to decide whether the court would reach the
same conclusion of the trip were on corporate business); see also Rocky Mountain Chipseal, LLC v.
Sherman Cnty., Kan., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1229 (D. Colo. 2012) (“When a corporate officer is served
in the forum state while she was there for reasons unrelated to the defendant-corporation, and that
corporation lacks minimum contacts with the forum state, serving that officer did not confer the forum
state with jurisdiction over the corporation.”); O’Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 617 (Colo. App. 1984)
(“Because there were no other contacts between Kemco and Colorado, the transitory and non-business
related presence of its president could not support finding the corporation’s presence within the state to
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.”).
187. See infra Part V (discussing an officer’s ability to act on the corporation’s behalf in other areas
of constitutional law).
188. 626 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
189. Id. at 842, 849.
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response to a different question—whether individual defendants can ever be subject
to general jurisdiction based on their ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts in a state
and in any event Justice Scalia made clear that the Court was expressing no views
on the matter.”190 Analyzing the issue for itself, the court found that
Permitting service on any employee or agent of a corporation to
create general jurisdiction on the theory that a corporation is
therefore “present” would create the same issues minimum
contacts hoped to resolve. A traditional minimum contacts
analysis removes the necessity of drawing bright but arbitrary lines
of where a non-physical entity is present and ensures that due
process is satisfied.191
The court did not explain why this same reasoning would not apply with
equal or even greater force to individual persons. Moreover, the court seemed to
assume that the “arbitrary” line drawing associated with presence based jurisdiction
would somehow replace minimum contacts with respect to corporations if such
jurisdiction were permitted. However, as Burnham made clear with respect to
individual defendants, it would do no such thing, but rather would only supplement
the existing contacts-based regime.
Other courts have explicitly found Burnham not binding either because it
produced no majority opinion192 or simply because it did not involve a corporation.193
For example, in MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc.,194
the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant whose vice-president was served with process while
present in Washington representing the corporation at a trade show.195 The court
reasoned that Burnham was “limited to its facts” because no opinion garnered
majority support, but that “[i]n any event, the nonresident defendant in Burnham was
a natural person.”196 Thus, the court concluded—without explaining why this
distinction was significant—”service of process on an agent of a nonresident

190. Id. at 849.
191. Id. at 850.
192. See MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627, 631 n.3.
(Wash. Ct. App 1991) (finding Burnham “limited to its facts”); Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals,
Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 413 (Tex. App. 1997) (“Burnham is a plurality opinion and does not provide the
persuasive, binding authority the [plaintiffs] attribute to it.”).
193. MBM Fisheries, 804 P.2d at 631 n.3; Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395 (JLL)(JAD),
2014 WL 1669873, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014) (“Plaintiffs’ reliance on Burnham is misplaced, as the
holding in Burnham only applies to individuals, not corporations.”); Overseas Partners, Inc. v. PROGEN
Musavirlik ve Yonetim Hizmetleri, Ltd. Sikerti, 15 F. Supp. 2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.D.C. 1998) (“There is
nothing in the Burnham opinion which indicates that the traditional minimum contacts test should be
abandoned when an official of a corporation is served within the relevant jurisdiction”); James v. Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Tex. App. 1998) (“Burnham involved a non-resident individual,
and the Court specifically omitted any reference of personal jurisdiction regarding corporations.”);
Conner, 944 S.W.2d at 413 (“Burnham does not speak to personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.”).
194. 804 P.2d 627 (1991).
195. Id. at 630, 632.
196. Id. at 631 n.3.
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corporation who is merely ‘present’ in Washington does not, without more, comport
with due process.”197
Of course, it is true that the defendant in Burnham was a natural person
rather than a business entity. However, that fact merely demonstrates that a question
exists; it does not provide the answer. While it is also true that no single opinion in
Burnham garnered five votes, that objection rings hollow since at least eight justices
so clearly agreed on the continuing validity of tag jurisdiction, even if they did so for
different reasons. Indeed, a straightforward application of the test from Marks v.
United States,198 which asks lower courts to divine a binding rule from a decision
with no majority opinion by adhering to the “position taken by those Members [of
the Court] who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds,”199 yields at
least the conclusion that Burnham means tag jurisdiction remains generally valid.200
Indeed, it is telling that no court appears to have used this justification to refrain from
applying tag jurisdiction to any individual defendant.201
B.

Courts Applying Tag Jurisdiction To Corporations

Although the courts refusing to apply tag jurisdiction to corporations are in
the majority, a few courts have readily cited Burnham to apply tag jurisdiction to
corporations.
For example, in Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex Industries, Inc.,202 the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over
a non-resident corporation based solely on the in-state service of that corporation’s
registered in-state agent.203 Citing Burnham, the court reasoned that although due
process ordinarily “requires that a nonresident defendant ‘reasonably anticipate’
being sued in the forum state, presence of an individual defendant in the forum state
accompanied by service, confers in personam jurisdiction.”204 The court also rejected
the argument that Justice Scalia’s footnote somehow precluded the exercise of
jurisdiction over corporations. The court argued that “Justice Scalia was not there

197. Id. Other courts have simply assumed Burnham does not apply to corporations with even less
reasoning than in MBM Fisheries. See, e.g., Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Saloon I, No. CV-081781-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 976598, at *3 n.4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2009) (dismissing the possibility of tag
jurisdiction over a company in a footnote citing other cases doing the same); Gonzalez v. Vlassios
Carriers, No. 90 CIV. 7979 (PNL), 1992 WL 350084, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (“While it is true
that such service on a natural person would confer the requisite personal jurisdiction, the same rule does
not apply to corporations, whose personnel do not—as do those to be served for a partnership or
association—carry the corporation around with them.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
198. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
199. Id. at 193 (quotations and citations omitted).
200. Although the Marks test has been criticized, see, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325
(2003), it has never been explicitly overruled and remains good law. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594
F.3d 210, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the Marks test).
201. See C.S.B. Commodities, Inc. v. Urban Trend LTD, 626 F. Supp. 2d 837, 846 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7,
2009) (“Since Burnham was decided, there does not appear to be a single published opinion in which a
court has found jurisdiction lacking where an individual was served in the forum.”).
202. 576 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
203. Id. at 944–945.
204. Id. at 944 (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607–09 (1990)) (additional citation
omitted).
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referring to circumstances limiting state jurisdiction, but to circumstances expanding
state jurisdiction and possibly unique to corporations, which obviously have no
personal presence anywhere.”205 The court’s analysis did not turn on the existence
of the registration statute, rather the court explicitly endorsed the idea that the
principle in Burnham applies to corporations.206
Other courts have accepted tag jurisdiction over entities, but done so with
less analysis. For example, in First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP,207 the
Second Circuit held that tag jurisdiction was applicable to a partnership where a
partner was served while doing business on behalf of a related partnership in New
York.208 The court did not delve too deeply into the implications of subjecting
partnerships to tag jurisdiction, but did note that the New York had a long history of
subjecting partnerships to jurisdiction on that basis, which accorded with Justice
Scalia’s emphasis in Burnham on historical pedigree.209 In Northern Light
Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club,210 the First Circuit allowed the assertion
of personal jurisdiction over a corporation through in-state service on a corporation’s
president.211 The court did not fully analyze the constitutional issue and instead relied
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)’s provision allowing personal service on
the officer of a corporation to support its holding.212 Likewise, in Oyuela v. Seacor
Marine (Nigeria), Inc.213, the Eastern District of Louisiana rejected the argument that
tag jurisdiction could not be applied to a Bahamian corporation whose officer was
served while present in Louisiana.214 The court simply noted that “Burnham’s
reassertion of the general validity of transient jurisdiction provides no indication that
it should only apply to natural persons.”215 At least one other court, although not
explicitly endorsing tag jurisdiction over corporations, has cited Burnham for the
proposition that the physical “presence” of a corporation through its occupation of
office space can support the assertion of jurisdiction over that corporation.216
205. Allied-Signal, 576 A.2d at 944–945.
206. Id. at 944.
207. 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998).
208. Id. at 20–21.
209. Id. at 20 (“The rule that service upon a partner in New York subjects a partnership to personal
jurisdiction is a venerable one.”).
210. 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
211. Id. at 63 n.10.
212. Id. The court also noted that in any event the defendants had waived the argument that service on
the corporation’s president (who was also a defendant personally in the action) failed to establish service
on the corporation. Id.
213. 290 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720 (E.D. La. 2003).
214. Id. at 719−20.
215. Id. at 720. The court in Oyuela also rested its holding on the alternative ground that the defendant
satisfied the International Shoe test. Id. at 721–22. Curiously, the court did not cite or distinguish Wenche
Siemer even though it was decided over a decade earlier and at least appears to suggest in dicta that the
Fifth Circuit would not apply tag jurisdiction to corporations. See supra, Part IV.A.
216. See Demirs v. Plexicraft, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 250, 254 (D.R.I. 1990) (“This Court notes that
although ‘minimum contacts’ has become the touchstone of in personam jurisdiction, presence of a
defendant in the jurisdiction is still to be considered. See Burnham . . . . To the extent that the corporate
defendant paid rent and thereby leased office space from the plaintiff, I find that the defendant established
a physical presence within Rhode Island which adds support to the already strong case for jurisdiction in
this forum.”) (footnote omitted).
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While these courts reached the correct conclusion, they failed to adequately
flesh out the doctrinal and theoretical justifications for applying tag jurisdiction to
corporations. As the previous section explained, the doctrine as announced by the
Court in Burnham provides strong support for the application of tag jurisdiction to
corporations. However, as the next section will argue, the theoretical framework
under which corporations have been granted constitutional rights on par with natural
persons also augurs for subjecting corporations to tag jurisdiction.
IV. CORPORATIONS AS PEOPLE
The idea of holding corporations to similar standards of personal
jurisdiction as natural persons may seem odd since there are obvious differences
between natural persons and corporations. However, in many areas of the law, and
in constitutional law in particular, the distinctions between corporations and natural
persons has been eroded significantly. Since corporations now enjoy many of the
benefits of constitutional personhood, it makes sense that they should also be treated
similarly to natural persons for purposes of personal jurisdiction analysis under the
Due Process Clause.217
A.

Corporations Become People

Corporations were not always thought of as equivalent to natural persons in
the law. During the era immediately after the founding, courts still considered
corporations creatures of the state’s creation that could not have any political
rights.218 For example, in one early case the Supreme Court found that corporations
could not even utilize federal courts.219 The Court found that as an “invisible,
intangible, and artificial being,” a corporation was “certainly not a citizen; and,
consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States.”220 This vision
of a corporation was consistent with the idea in very early case law, discussed in Part
III.A, supra, that a corporation, as a creature of the state, could not leave its state of
incorporation for jurisdictional purposes.
However, that attitude began to change as the role of corporations in society
began to expand dramatically. At the time of the founding, there were only six nonbank corporations in existence in the United States.221 By the time the Fourteenth

217. Cf. Michalski, supra note 80, at 130 (“[A] more robust understanding of corporate citizenship
and corporate rights correlates with a more robust ability of the state to exercise jurisdiction over
corporations.”).
218. See, e.g., Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood,
the Affordable Care Act, and the Corporate Person: How A Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the
Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 212 (2014) (“[P]rior to adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, corporations had limited protection from state regulation.”); Michalski, supra
note 80, at 132 (“Early case law in the young Republic did not conceive of corporations as persons or
citizens.”).
219. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–87 (1809).
220. Id.
221. Michalski, supra note 80, at 133 n.24 (citing WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE
OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 49 (1997)).
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Amendment was ratified, the corporate form had exploded in popularity, particularly
for larger businesses.222
Perhaps in response to these changes, the courts began to expand their
conception of a corporation’s role under the law. No longer were corporations
thought of as creatures of the state, but rather they were reconceived as the creation
of a collection of private individuals.223 Scholars refer to this as the “aggregate
theory” of corporate personhood.224 Under this “aggregate theory,” corporations
could be more easily conceptualized as being present in places other than their place
of incorporation since the people who make up a corporation can travel at will. This
understanding led to the increasing acceptance of service of process on corporate
agents present in other states on corporate business as a valid method for acquiring
personal jurisdiction over corporations as discussed in Part III.A, supra.225
However, while the prominence of the aggregate theory around the time of
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the application of tag
jurisdiction to corporations under an originalist methodology,226 the relationship
between corporations and the Constitution did not stop evolving there. Since that
time, corporations have gone from being thought of as mere aggregations of natural
persons, to entirely independent entities on virtually the same constitutional footing
as natural persons.
Starting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a theory of
corporations as entities independent of the natural persons that make them up began
to emerge.227 This theory is sometimes called the “real entity” theory by scholars.228
In this era, courts began to accord corporations many constitutional rights including
protection under the Equal Protection Clause229 and Due Process Clause230 of the

222. See, e.g., Michalski, supra note 80, at 139 (noting the “massive expansion of corporations in the
late nineteenth century”); Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV. 457, 486
(2013) (“[A]fter the American Revolutionary War, there was a significant numerical increase in the
number of corporations chartered by the states.”); see also Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387,
425−27 (2003) (explaining that the rapid growth of general incorporation statutes during the early to midnineteenth century facilitated the growth of corporations and hypothesizing that the demand for such
corporations was driven by the desire of businesses to “expand their operations beyond what a few
individuals could fund, manage, and carry out”).
223. See, e.g., Michalski, supra note 80, at 136−39.
224. See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 218, at 220; Michalski, supra note 80, at 136−39; Lyman Johnson,
Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1135, 1154 (2012).
225. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353 (1882) (“A corporation, being an artificial being,
can act only through agents, and only through them can be reached, and process must, therefore, be served
upon them.”).
226. See supra Part III.A.
227. See Michalski, supra note 80, at 139−40; Teneille R. Brown, In-Corp-O-Real: A Psychological
Critique of Corporate Personhood and Citizens United, 12 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1, 33−34 (2013).
228. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 227, at 33–34.
229. See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181,
187– 89 (1888).
230. See Covington & L. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
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Fourteenth Amendment,231 the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,232 and
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.233
Under this conception, corporations became nearly indistinguishable for
constitutional purposes from actual persons.
The trend of according corporations constitutional rights similar to natural
persons has only accelerated in recent years.234 Most prominently, in Citizens United
v. FEC,235 the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting corporations from
broadcasting electioneering communications in the days leading up to federal
elections violated the First Amendment,236 overruling several earlier decisions
allowing similar practices, including Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.237
Although the Court had held before that the First Amendment protects speech by
corporations,238 the Court’s reasoning in Citizens United strongly drove home the
point that any differential treatment by the government of corporate speakers versus
natural person speakers is invalid.239 The Court reinforced the idea that a corporation
is much more than an aggregation of its owners; rather, it is a completely independent
entity with its own right to influence the political process. The Court’s rejection of
two of the government’s arguments in particular reflects its endorsement of this
premise.
First, the Court rejected the argument that a corporation’s ability under the
statute to speak through an independent political action committee obviated the need
to allow it to speak directly. The Court reasoned that “[a] PAC is a separate
association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from [the] expenditure ban
does not allow the corporation to speak.”240 In essence, even though the PAC would
have been controlled by the same people who controlled the corporation, it was no
substitute because the PAC was not the same “person” as the corporation. Second,
the Court rejected the argument that the government had an interest in preventing
corporate speech that may be opposed by some of the corporation’s shareholders.241
If a corporation were understood to be an aggregate of individuals, than its speech

231. For a fascinating account of how the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section came to be recognized
as protecting corporations see Harkins, supra note 218, at 245−71.
232. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
233. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), overruled in part on other grounds by
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
234. See Michalski, supra note 80, at 144–48.
235. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
236. Id. at 336–41, 365–66.
237. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
238. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (collecting cases).
239. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 227, at 5 (“[T]he [Citizens United] decision obliterated many of the
existing distinctions between corporations and unions, media and non-media companies, and nonprofit
and for-profit entities. By casting these historical distinctions aside, it became possible to render corporate
political speech as constitutionally equivalent to the speech of ordinary human beings.”); David H. Gans
& Douglas T. Kendall, A Capitalist Joker: The Strange Origins, Disturbing Past, and Uncertain Future
of Corporate Personhood in American Law, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643, 698 (2011) (“Citizens United
is one of the most far-reaching opinions on the rights of corporations in Supreme Court history.”).
240. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38 (citations omitted).
241. Id. at 361–62.
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rights and interests would merely be contiguous with that of its shareholders.242
Instead, the Court advised aggrieved shareholders to take it up with the corporation’s
governing structure—i.e., its officers and directors—if shareholders disagreed with
the corporation’s speech.243 Thus, the Court strongly stood behind the view of
corporations as constitutional persons with a right to express themselves through the
officers and directors who control them, independent of even the corporation’s
owners.
But the Court did even more in Citizens United than firmly shut the door on
the aggregate theory of corporate existence. The Court also rejected the idea that
because the law is the source of a corporation’s existence the government may curtail
corporate rights:
Either as support for its antidistortion rationale or as a further
argument, the Austin majority undertook to distinguish wealthy
individuals from corporations on the ground that “[s]tate law
grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets.” . . . This does not suffice, however, to allow
laws prohibiting speech. It is rudimentary that the State cannot
exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First
Amendment rights.244
This statement reflects the long journey corporations have made from being mere
creatures of the state that could be regulated at will and could not even leave their
home state in the founding era,245 to being entities that are not merely independent
of the sovereign that gave them “life,” but are in fact protected from that sovereign
(and the federal government) by the Constitution.246
Citizens United is no outlier. Other recent cases in the Supreme Court and
lower courts have adopted similar views in granting corporations constitutional
protection including ‘negative’ free speech rights,247 rights under the Free Exercise

242. See Brown, supra note 227, at 38 (noting that the real entity theory of corporate personhood was
attractive to its proponents in part because “it resolved the aggregate theory problem of having no sharp
practical divide between the shareholder owners of the company and those actually controlling the board.
It fixed this problem by re-describing the ‘will’ or ‘intent’ of the corporation and its shareholders as the
collective ‘will’ of its managers.”).
243. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (“There is . . . little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders through the procedures of corporate democracy.”) (quotations and citation
omitted).
244. Id. at 350–51 (quotations and citation omitted).
245. See id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that at the time of the founding “[c]orporations
were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities, designed to serve a social function
for the state”) (quotations and citations omitted).
246. See Brown supra note 227, at 37 (“By invoking the counterintuitive idea that corporations are
natural and independent entities, proponents [of the real entity theory] sought to establish that ‘[t]he law
does not create corporations but merely recognizes their independent existence.’”).
247. That is, the right not to be compelled to be associated with speech with which the speaker
disagrees. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (“For corporations
as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say.”).
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Clause,248 protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,249 the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases,250 and the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.251 In addition, corporations have been
afforded important statutory protection under several civil rights laws.252 Scholars
have suggested that the list of rights afforded corporations may grow further as this
new understanding of the corporation is applied to other constitutional provisions.253
B.

Corporate Constitutional Persons Are Subject To Tag Jurisdiction

The expansion of corporate rights via an embrace of the natural entity
theory of the corporation supports the application of tag jurisdiction to corporations
for at least two reasons. First, the understanding of a corporation as an entity
independent of its shareholders or the state is consistent with the idea of corporations
being present wherever their officers are conducting corporate business. Second, it
would be fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with the precedents expanding
corporate rights to afford corporations greater rights than natural persons enjoy
under the Due Process Clause by exempting corporations from tag jurisdiction.
As described above, recent cases have embraced the idea that corporations
are independent entities rather than aggregations of their shareholders or creatures of
the state’s creation. This theory of corporate personhood logically aligns with the
application of tag jurisdiction to corporations. In Citizens United the Court did not
equate the political views of a corporation with those of its shareholders (or
employees) but rather with the views of those running the corporation (i.e., its
officers and directors). Tag jurisdiction similarly equates the presence of a
corporation to the presence of its officers or directors, rather than to the presence of
employees or shareholders. Just as officers can make decisions about what a
corporation will say254 for constitutional purposes, so too can they make decisions
about where a corporation will be.

248. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133–37 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc),
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
249. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934, 935–936 (4th Cir. 1982).
251. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970).
252. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (“[A] federal regulation’s
restriction on the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with [the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act]”); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1979)
(“Corporations are persons whose rights are protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
253. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 890 (2011) (“[T]he Court’s repeated reference to the First
Amendment as an interpretive analog for the Second would seem to augur for some level of corporate
Second Amendment rights.”); Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth
Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1996) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment
“fits squarely within the Court’s precedent for extending rights to corporations”). See also Howard Sec.
Servs., Inc. v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 516 F. Supp. 508, 513 n.10 (D. Md. 1981) (finding it “at least
arguable” that corporations could be protected by the Thirteenth Amendment).
254. And, perhaps, believe. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75 (dismissing concerns about
disputes among the owners of a corporation related to religious exercise because “[s]tate corporate law
provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can
establish its governing structure”).
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The entity theory of corporate personhood also eliminates any meaningfully
distinction between corporations and natural persons in terms of their ability to travel
between fora. If corporations were mere creations of their state of origin, it might be
reasonable to argue that a corporation would need to do something more
comprehensive than a natural person in order to “leave” that state and enter another
one. However, though corporations may still be created by states, they now enjoy the
ability to come and go as they please. Moreover, unlike in the past, a corporate officer
can now, in a very real sense, carry her authority as a corporate officer with her when
she conducts business in another state. This is particularly true in jurisdictions that
follow the fiduciary shield doctrine, forbidding courts from exercising jurisdiction
over corporate agents based on the actions agents take while present in a forum solely
as agents of the corporation.255 Thus, the officer is in some instances not himself or
herself at all for jurisdictional purposes when he or she enters a forum on the
corporation’s behalf, but instead becomes entirely a vessel for corporate presence.
Once an officer traveling at the corporation’s behest is understood this way, it would
be inconsistent with the notions of state sovereignty undergirding recent Supreme
Court personal jurisdiction cases256 to allow a corporation to travel deliberately from
one state to another while avoiding the sovereign authority of the destination state.
As many scholars have recognized, the expansion of corporate rights and
the embrace of the natural entity theory also augurs for increased corporate
responsibility in other areas of law.257 In the personal jurisdiction context, Professor
Roger Michalski has argued that the increased protection corporations have received
under the Constitution should be taken into account in examining personal
jurisdiction under the International Shoe framework.258 Professor Michalski
proposes that the exercise of the political rights granted by these recent court
decisions should be a relevant “contact” for purposes of determining whether the
minimum contacts test is satisfied259
This makes sense in the context of the International Shoe framework: the
contacts made when exercising political rights are just as probative a measure of a
corporation’s connection to the forum as business contacts. Indeed, under current
255. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of “Fiduciary Shield”
Doctrine—Modern Cases, 79 A.L.R.5th 587 (originally published in 2000); see also C.S.B. Commodities,
Inc. v. Urban Trend Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 2d 837, 847 (analyzing whether the fiduciary shield doctrine might
prevent the exercise jurisdiction even though the defendant was served while physically present in the
forum).
256. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 8, at 415; John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and
the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. Mcintyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 827, 844 (2012).
257. See, e.g., Michalski, supra note 80, at 141 (“The natural entity theory of the corporation thus
provides a theoretical basis for corporate social responsibility.”); Beth Stephens, Are Corporations
People? Corporate Personhood Under the Constitution and International Law, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 17
(2013) (“This textured, multi-faceted view of corporations, their role in society, and their personhood
leads the courts to conclude that constitutional protections apply to corporations, even though the
Constitution does not mention them. As I turn to look at corporations and human rights accountability, I
suggest that, if the courts engaged in the same analysis of the nature of corporations when they interpreted
international law, they would recognize that corporations can and should be held liable for genocide and
similar human rights abuses.”).
258. See Michalski, supra note 80, at 162–63.
259. See id. at 186–88.
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doctrine, it is likely already the case that a corporation’s political activity would be
a relevant contact in determining personal jurisdiction.260 Professor Michalski
soundly argues that such activities are a legitimate consideration in personal
jurisdiction based on a hypothetical consent theory in which “artificial and real
persons acquire political obligations because they would have agreed to take on these
obligations, if asked, in order to secure [their] rights and freedoms.”261
However, it is important to recognize that my argument is distinct from this
one. Corporations should not bear the burden of tag jurisdiction because of a
hypothetical trade they have made for the “benefit” of constitutional rights. Rather,
corporations should be subject to tag jurisdiction because of the methodological
approach courts took in order to afford corporations constitutional rights: equating
corporations with natural persons.262
If corporations are equals to natural persons, then they should be afforded
(at most) equivalent constitutional rights to natural persons, not greater rights. The
holding in Burnham is that the Due Process Clause does not protect a natural person
from being subject to jurisdiction on the basis of only their temporary presence in
another state. Since corporations are now considered the equivalent of a natural
person for purposes of most constitutional provisions (including the Due Process
Clause), there is no reason why they should be given greater protection under the
Due Process Clause than that to which a natural person is entitled—including in the
context of tag jurisdiction.

260. See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2006) (“But,
jurisdiction here is not predicated on sales, or even the notion of substantial sales, alone. The minimum
contacts are established by the confluence of Reynolds’ physical, economic, and political presence and
the company’s myriad other activities in the state.”).
261. Michalski, supra note 80, at 179. Professor Michalski has also argued in another article that
corporations should be treated separately from natural persons for purposes of jurisdictional rules. See
Roger Michalski, Trans-Personal Procedures, 47 CONN. L. REV. 321, 392 (2014) (“A natural conclusion
of this argument is to bifurcate the doctrine into two parts: personal jurisdiction and entity jurisdiction.
This would allow courts to recognize the fundamental differences between natural and artificial persons
and craft rules uniquely suited for each.”). I agree that, in some instances, the differences between
corporations and natural persons may justify affording corporations less protection under the Due Process
Clause than individual persons. Cf. Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (“It may
be that whatever special rule exists permitting ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts, to support jurisdiction
with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum applies only to corporations[.]”) (citation
omitted). However, I do not believe any of these differences justify affording corporations greater Due
Process Clause protection from exercises of personal jurisdiction.
262. See Matambanadzo, supra note 222, at 502 (describing the metaphors tied to the human body
courts have used in the entity theory era to analyze corporate personhood issues and noting that this
“embodiment theory of corporate personhood rests upon the metaphorical notion that a corporation, a
disembodied, legally constructed entity, is identical to, or at least similarly situated to, an embodied human
being”).
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V. CONCLUSION
As many have argued, it may be unfair or otherwise bad policy to continue
to have tag jurisdiction.263 It also may be unwise or even a threat to democracy to
continue to afford corporations constitutional rights akin to natural persons.264 But,
as long as we are going to have tag jurisdiction and corporate constitutional persons,
corporations should be subject to tag jurisdiction just like the rest of us.265

263. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 153, at 518 (“Burnham is most glaringly wrong, however, in its primary
conclusion, shared by all the Justices, that transient presence jurisdiction is under most circumstances
constitutional.”); Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 659, 659–60 (1991) (“Neither of these minority opinions satisfactorily confronts the aspect
of service jurisdiction that most troubles me: that gives a state general jurisdiction over a defendant based
on the happenstance of his being found and served in the state.”); Barbara Surtees Goto, Note,
International Shoe Gets the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court Resurrects the Physical Power Theory, 24
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 851, 899 (1991) (“A correct application of the minimum contacts analysis to the
transient rule of jurisdiction would highlight the inherent unfairness of the rule and mandate its
destruction.”); Michael Rose, Note, Burnham v. Superior Court and the (Partial) Vindication of Transient
Jurisdiction, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 899, 915 (1991) (“The transient jurisdiction rule has clearly outlived its
usefulness. Moreover, in its pristine form, it is capable of working surprise and hardship.”); Eliot D.
Prescott, Transient Jurisdiction is Here to Stay: Burham v. Superior Court of California, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 1125, 1158 (1991) (“Transient jurisdiction should be stricken from American jurisprudence, not
only because it is unconstitutional in its violation of an individual’s due process rights, but also because
as a rule, it is not jurisprudentially sound.”).
264. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 717,
726 (2011) (“This new era of corporate rights dominating the rights of natural persons may lead to a new
period of tiered legal personhood in our democracy, an outcome that is inconsistent with the vision of
rights under our modern Constitution.”); Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have
Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 524 (2010) (“[T]he concept of corporate personhood . . . has been employed to
accord corporations rights under the Bill of Rights in spite of the fact that such rights were created only
for individuals.”); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 655 (1990) (“The treatment of corporations as persons under the Bill of Rights is
intuitively problematic. The personification of the corporation also broadly enhances the power of
corporate management in a manner inconsistent with most modern schools of thought on constitutional
law.”); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90
YALE L.J. 1833, 1859–60 (1981) (“If liberal democratic principles are retained, however, the recognition
of corporate rights makes the coexistence of vigorous democracy and vigorous individual rights of all
sorts unnecessarily problematic.”).
265. This article was edited by New Mexico Law Review Manuscript Editor Elliot Barela.

